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INTRODUCTION
How we categorize our rules helps to shape what they become. Lawmakers know their subjects, of course, and they aspire to formulate rules on the merits; no one could fairly brand
these craftsmen as simple-minded. Nevertheless, they remain
conspicuously symbol-minded. Like laypersons—only more so—
lawmakers rely on abstract symbols to streamline their thinking.1 By gathering doctrines under a single categorical umbrel† William & Catherine VanDercreek Professor of Law, Florida State
University. M.A. 1979, J.D. 1982, Ph.D. 1987, Yale University. My thanks to
Gregory Alexander, Mark Ascher, Shawn Bayern, Andrew Gold, Matthew
Harding, John Langbein, Dan Markel, Grayson McCouch, Robert Sitkoff, Joshua
Tate, and auditors at faculty colloquia at Arizona State University College of
Law, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law, and the University of Tulsa
College of Law for helpful comments. Copyright © 2011 by Adam J. Hirsch.
1. With his usual acuity, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. recognized this tendency and warned against overreliance on symbols with his aphorism that
“[w]e must think things not words, or at least we must constantly translate
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la, we connect them symbolically and encourage lawmakers to
harmonize law within the defined category. Likewise, by distinguishing categories and decorating them with different symbols, we discourage comparative analysis, and thereby obscure
coincidences of policy that nonetheless link the isolated doctrines structurally. Pointless inconsistencies of law often follow.
Although it may not steer rules along predetermined paths, legal taxonomy guides lawmakers to scout in given directions for
relevant symmetries and analogies. It serves, in other words, as
a sort of compass, which—depending on how well it is calibrated—can send lawmakers wandering down blind alleys or
lead them straight to the heart of things.2
The prevailing canon categorizes gratuitous transfers as a
branch of property law—“family property law,” as the American
Law Institute would have it.3 Accordingly, the doctrines of gifts
and wills have occupied a volume of the second, and now of the
third, Restatement of Property.4 Considered structurally,
though, the essential doctrines of property delineate rights of
exclusivity, of an owner against all others—or, as legal historians are wont to say, matters of meum and tuum. By contrast,
the doctrines of gifts and wills are secondary: presupposing
that an exclusive right to property exists, these doctrines address owners’ subsidiary rights to move their property into other hands—matters involving economic interrelations between
persons.
Thus conceptualized, doctrines of gifts and wills appear to
resemble secondary doctrines governing other sorts of voluntary
movements of property—to wit, exchanges, which fall under the
our words into the facts for which they stand, if we are to keep to the real and
the true.” Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV.
L. REV. 443, 460 (1899).
2. For a fuller discussion, see Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance and Inconsistency, 57 OHIO ST. L. REV. 1057, 1135–62 (1996); see also ANTHONY G.
AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 19–53 (2000) (weighing
the virtues and vices of categorization); Emily Sherwin, Legal Taxonomy, 15
LEGAL THEORY 25, 39–43 (2009) (assessing the functions of legal categorization).
3. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS intro. (2003).
4. Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS (1983);
see also, e.g., 1 WILLIAM H. PAGE, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 1.1, at 1 (Jeffrey A. Schoenblum ed., rev. ed. 2003 & Supp. 2009) (“The law of wills . . . is
clearly a part of the law of property.”); Peter Birks, Introduction to ENGLISH
PRIVATE LAW ix, xxxv–xli (Peter Birks ed., 2000) (classifying wills as a subcategory of the law of property, and contracts as a subcategory of the law of obligations). This categorical framework traces back to Roman law, if not earlier.
THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 65, 111, 198 (J.A.C. Thomas ed., 1975).
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rubric of contract law. The two may feature a closer connection
than even this correspondence would suggest. Whereas some
benefactors may make gifts and bequests that are wholly altruistic and unilateral, gratuitous transfers frequently involve
implicit elements of exchange, albeit ones not adorned with the
symbol “consideration” by the legal system. Scholars from a
range of disciplines have explored the phenomenon.5 And even
though, for want of a symbol, courts decline to enforce such
quasi-exchanges as obligations, they may remain self-enforcing
via the unstated threat to terminate the parties’ relationship—
a sanction also lurking in the background of contractual exchange.6 In reality, then, the distinction between contracts and
gratuities is a blurry one. Each occasions productive activity,
and although gratuities fuel a more shrouded, gray economy,

5. The literature on this subject is as scattered as it is vast. For a classic
economic discussion, see KENNETH E. BOULDING, THE ECONOMY OF LOVE AND
FEAR (1973). For more recent discussions, see, for example, THE ECONOMICS
OF RECIPROCITY, GIVING AND ALTRUISM (L.-A. Gérard-Varet et al. eds., 2000);
1 & 2 HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF GIVING, ALTRUISM AND RECIPROCITY
(Serge-Christophe Kolm & Jean M. Ythier eds., 2006); ODED STARK, ALTRUISM
AND BEYOND (1995); Avner Offer, Between the Gift and the Market: The Economy of Regard, 50 ECON. HIST. REV. 450 passim (1997). For field studies, see
Stefano DellaVigna, Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field, 47 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 315, 339–41 (2009); Armin Falk, Note, Gift Exchange in the
Field, 75 ECONOMETRICA 1501 passim (2007). For an anthropological discussion, see, for example, MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT (W.D. Hall trans., 1990). For
a sociological discussion, see, for example, DAVID CHEAL, THE GIFT ECONOMY
(1988). For a historical discussion, see, for example, ILANA KRAUSMAN BENAMOS, THE CULTURE OF GIVING: INFORMAL SUPPORT AND GIFT EXCHANGE IN
EARLY MODERN ENGLAND (2008). For a philosophical discussion, see, for example, DAVID J. OWENS, Obligation and Involvement, in SHAPING THE
NORMATIVE LANDSCAPE (forthcoming 2012). For a psychological discussion,
see, for example, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GRATITUDE (Robert A. Emmons & Michael E. McCullough eds., 2004). For a study grounded in behavioral biology,
see, for example, Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange, in THE ADAPTED MIND 163 passim (Jerome H. Barkow et al.
eds., 1992). For a study grounded in population genetics, see, for example, Samuel Bowles, Did Warfare Among Ancestral Hunter-Gatherers Affect the Evolution of Human Social Behaviors?, 324 SCIENCE, June 5, 2009, at 1293 passim.
For neuroeconomic research, see, for example, James K. Rilling & Alan G.
Sanfrey, The Neuroscience of Social Decision-Making, 62 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL.
23, 26–28 (2011). For an interdisciplinary anthology, see THE QUESTION OF
THE GIFT (Mark Osteen ed., 2002). For additional references, see Adam J.
Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 IND.
L.J. 1, 9 n.30 (1992).
6. Benjamin Klein, The Role of Incomplete Contracts in Self-Enforcing
Relationships, in THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACTS 59 passim (Eric Brousseau &
Jean-Michel Glachant eds., 2002).

2011]

TESTATION AND CONTRACT

2183

that economy nevertheless rivals the traditional market in its
social significance.7
Nor do the linkages end there. Just as gratuities may mask
quasi-exchanges, contracts may mask quasi-subsidies, where
bargains are knowingly disproportionate.8 The two economies,
in short, can converge, and this convergence may be more than
tacit. Some transfers formally combine exchange with gratuity.
These include third-party beneficiary contracts, transfers in
trust to a compensated third-party trustee, and, in a testamentary context, contracts to make wills, contracts with pay-ondeath designations, the rare but interesting “bequest” of a period of employment9―plus some other compounds whose less
conspicuous attributes need clarifying.10
The foundational claim of this Article is that associating
the law of gratuities with the law of contracts, gathered within
a reconfigured category of transfers, would pay conceptual dividends and, at the end of the day, promote public policy.11 This
7. Economic studies have found that a large fraction (possibly in the
range of eighty percent) of household wealth in the United States traces to
gifts and inheritances, as opposed to participation in the labor economy. William G. Gale & John K. Scholz, Intergenerational Transfers and the Accumulation of Wealth, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 145, 146–47, 156–57 (1994) (citing to earlier
studies); Pierre Pestieau, The Role of Gift and Estate Transfers in the United
States and in Europe, in DEATH AND DOLLARS 64, 71–74 (Alicia H. Munnell &
Annika Sundén eds., 2003) (citing to earlier studies). For a recent study of the
relative importance of exchange and altruism in prompting these transfers,
both in the context of gifts and of bequests, see Edward C. Norton & Courtney
H. Van Houtven, Inter Vivos Transfers and Exchange, 73 S. ECON. J. 157 passim (2006) (citing to earlier conflicting studies, and finding evidence of exchange as inducing gifts but not bequests). For references to additional relevant studies, see infra note 212.
8. For a recognition of this social reality and its implications for the consideration requirement in contract law, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS §§ 71 & cmt. c, 79 & cmt. d (1981). The phenomenon of “altruistic”
contracts is sufficiently familiar that, in connection with employment, we have
a nontechnical word to describe them—we call these labor agreements sinecures. But contracts can blend elements of gift and exchange. For discussions,
see George A. Akerlof, Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange, 97 Q.J. ECON.
543 passim (1982); Offer, supra note 5, at 472; Florian Englmaier & Steve Leider, Gift Exchange in the Lab—It Is Not (Only) How Much You Give . . . , at 1
(2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1546364.
9. See, e.g., D’Arcangelo v. D’Arcangelo, 43 A.2d 169, 170–71 (N.J. Ch.
1945) (holding such an instruction not to comprise a legacy but nevertheless to
be enforceable for a testator’s wholly owned business); Hughes v. Hiscox, 174
N.Y.S. 564, 565–69 (Sup. Ct. 1919) (same).
10. See infra text following note 53 and text accompanying note 170.
11. Of course, we can continue to conceptualize property as a metacategory incorporating transfers of both sorts as sources or forms of wealth. See
Birks, supra note 4, at xlii (categorizing wills within the law of property and
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is not to say that all distinctions of doctrine between gratuities
and contracts ought to be obliterated. Plainly, many are justified,12 just as particular distinctions between gifts and wills
within gratuitous transfers law are justified, and particular
distinctions between bargains for goods and for services within
contract law are justified. The categories we choose to set apart
need not be pristine to be useful. Simply by identifying gratuities and contracts as kindred problems, we call attention to
doctrinal asymmetries that have taken shape—and then press
lawmakers either to smooth out those asymmetries or to vindicate them, in the face of provisional skepticism.
To be sure, the categorical relation highlighted in this Article has not escaped all notice. As early as the seventeenth
century, legal thinkers asserted that, in various doctrinal contexts, “‘a valid argument runs from contracts to last wills, and
vice-versa.’”13 Commentators have continued to make the point
now and again.14 Nevertheless, the relation has never gone
contracts within the law of obligations but accepting that “[a]t the highest level of generality” both “arise from a manifestation of the consent of some grantor . . . . Manifestations of consent include contracts, conveyances, and wills.”).
See generally Andrew S. Gold, A Property Theory of Contract, 103 NW. U. L.
REV. 1 (2009).
12. For a defense of one such doctrinal distinction that nevertheless draws
attention to the categorical relation, see Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The World of
Contract and the World of Gift, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 821 passim (1997).
13. R.H. Helmholz, The Origins of Holographic Wills in English Law, 15
J. LEGAL HIST. 97, 102 (1994) (quoting English formulary manuscript c. 1620,
translated from the Latin text).
14. In the eighteenth century, as organized by Blackstone, “contract and
succession are both dealt with as means by which the title to property gets
transferred. There is no doubt that freedom of contract and freedom of testation were then, and later, closely connected ideas.” P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND
FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 89 (1979). In the nineteenth century, Jeremy
Bentham identified wills as a subcategory of contracts. JEREMY BENTHAM, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, in 6 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 189, 530
(John Bowring ed., Russell & Russell 1962) (1827). In the twentieth century,
H.L.A. Hart grouped the law of wills with the law of contracts as coequal bodies of “power-conferring rules,” allowing individuals “to vary their initial positions under the primary rules,” which Hart rated as “one of the great contributions of law to social life.” H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 28, 94 (1961).
Still more recently, in the course of elaborating the conventional scheme of
classification, the American Law Institute paused to acknowledge the relation:
“This part of the Restatement . . . excludes . . . commercial transactions in
property, even though some of the property problems dealt with herein may
arise in a commercial context as well as in a donative one.” RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS intro. (1983); see also, e.g., JOSEPH
M. PERILLO, CALAMARI & PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 3.2(b), at 109 (6th ed.
2009) (observing that, with regard to the formal requirements for contractual
and testamentary transfers, “[t]he Statute of Frauds and the Statute of Wills
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through the rigors of systematic inquiry. Formal reclassification of wills and contracts as branches of transfers law within
codes and Restatements would function to prompt such inquiry.
In earlier work, I cross-examined default rule principles
within the law of wills and contracts, concluding that the
theory applicable to contractual defaults readily carries over to
inheritance defaults and should serve as a model for both.15
The present Article broadens the comparison to mandatory
rules—more exactly, mandatory substantive rules,16 setting
limits on freedom of testation and freedom of contract, respectively. I shall leave for another day mandatory limits on a
transferor’s right to create any will or contract on account of
the transferor’s state of mind, embodied in structurally corresponding doctrines of testamentary and contractual capacity.
Likewise, the problem of encroachment by third parties upon
the exercise of testamentary or contractual freedom, addressed
by doctrines of fraud, duress, undue influence, and tortious interference—again, each with a parallel in the law of wills and
the law of contracts—merits separate treatment. More than
enough remains to occupy us for awhile.
Part I lays a theoretical foundation by comparing the justifications for freedom of contract, together with rationales for
limiting it, with freedom of testation and its limits. The sections following proceed to measure and reassess from a contracts perspective the sphere of freedom of testation in greater
depth. Part II inspects prevailing restrictions on conditional
bequests. Part III takes up restrictions applicable even to unconditional bequests. Part IV explores the polar-opposite topic
embody similar considerations”). An analogous connection has been drawn between the laws of trusts and contracts, although it remains a matter of controversy. John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105
YALE L.J. 625 passim (1995); see also David Horton, Unconscionability in the
Law of Trusts, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1675 passim (2009) (arguing that trust
law should absorb the unconscionability doctrine from contract law); cf. Henry
Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal
and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434, 469–72 (1998); Robert H.
Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 627–
34 (2004); Joshua C. Tate, Should Charitable Trust Enforcement Rights Be Assignable?, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1045, 1056–67 (2010).
15. Adam J. Hirsch, Default Rules in Inheritance Law: A Problem in
Search of Its Context, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1031 passim (2004) [hereinafter
Hirsch, Default Rules]. For an extension of this analysis, see Adam J. Hirsch,
Text and Time: A Theory of Testamentary Obsolescence, 86 WASH. U. L. REV.
609, 633–35, 659–63 (2009) [hereinafter Hirsch, Obsolescence].
16. For a discussion of mandatory procedural rules for formalizing wills in
comparison to contracts, see Hirsch, supra note 2, at 1078–82.
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of compulsory bequests. Part V turns finally to the temporal
dimension of testation—that is, the power of a testator to
project his or her estate-planning edicts into the future.
I. THEORETICAL PROLOGUE
“[L]iberty is not a value but the ground of value.”
—W.H. Auden17
Many thinkers (not least Patrick Henry) would take issue
with Auden’s dictum. We may prize economic autonomy along
with other liberties for their own sake.18 Freedom of contract
and of gift-giving fit snugly within a libertarian ethic, but freedom of testation, narrowly defined, carries that ethic into new
existential territory: Must we respect persons’ autonomy embodied in a last will, even after they have become disembodied?
Philosophers perennially debate the matter,19 and we shall
have to leave it there. Yet, as Auden suggests, the problem does
not end there; we can identify virtues in liberty without embracing libertarianism. Our analysis can focus, alternatively,
on utilitarian concerns. Whether or not we deem it a good per
se, economic autonomy facilitates our obtaining other goods.
Freedom of contract, coupled with legal mechanisms of
contract enforcement, create the conditions under which markets proliferate. Voluntary trade is utility-enhancing for both
parties to a transaction, channeling items of property to the

17. W.H. Auden, Introduction to HENRY JAMES, THE AMERICAN SCENE, at
xviii (W.H. Auden ed., 1946) (1907).
18. See In re Wilkins’ Estate, 211 N.W. 652, 653–54 (Wis. 1927) (exalting
freedom of testation as a “sacred right”); Printing & Numerical Registering Co.
v. Sampson, [1875] L.R.Eq. 462 at 465 (Eng.) (“Contracts when entered into
freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred.”); see also, e.g., CHARLES FRIED,
CONTRACT AS PROMISE 2 (1981) (lauding freedom of contract as an expression
of “liberal individualism”). For a broader discussion distinguishing the “opportunity” and “process” components of freedom, see AMARTYA SEN, RATIONALITY
AND FREEDOM 506–27, 583–695 (2002).
19. For a summary, see Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 7 & n.23. For
broader discussions, see DANIEL SPERLING, POSTHUMOUS INTERESTS: LEGAL
AND ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES (2008); Kirsten R. Smolensky, Rights of the Dead,
37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 763 passim (2009). For a literary observation of the conundrum, see CHARLES DICKENS, OUR MUTUAL FRIEND 4 –5 (New York, Macmillan & Co. 1895) (1865) (“What world does a dead man belong to? T’other
world. What world does money belong to? This world. Can a corpse own it,
want it, spend it, claim it, miss it?”).
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party who values them more.20 And these gains from trade are
only the beginning, since the opportunity for trade facilitates
the division of labor, thereby unlocking productive energies and
efficiencies that expand the sum of tradable property available—hence contributing not merely to a Pareto optimal allocation of resources, but to plenty.21
Analogous benefits flow from freedom of testation. Gratuitous transfers obviously benefit recipients, but they simultaneously gratify a benefactor, whose happiness depends on
theirs (given an interdependent utility function, in the icy jargon of economics)—a Pareto optimal gain from transfer, as opposed to trade.22 Although benefactors cannot share in a beneficiary’s utility from an inheritance at the time of its receipt,
they can envision it, and derive present utility from its anticipation.23 Giving persons the right to make a will therefore encourages them to produce and to save more wealth,24 again
adding to the sum of capital stock.25 Freedom of testation can
20. E.g., Anthony T. Kronman & Richard A. Posner, Introduction: Economic Theory and Contract Law, in THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 1, 1–4
(Anthony T. Kronman & Richard A. Posner eds., 1979).
21. E.g., Douglass C. North, Institutions and Economic Growth: An Historical Introduction, 17 WORLD DEV. 1319, 1319–21 (1989). For an early discussion, see 1 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 7–20 (Edwin Cannan
ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 1976) (1776). For a judicial recognition, see Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, 13 N.E. 419, 421–22 (N.Y. 1887) (“It is an encouragement to industry and to enterprise in building up a trade, that a man shall
be allowed to sell the good-will of the business and the fruits of his industry
upon the best terms he can obtain.”). For an argument that the division of labor (and, by extension, the free trade permitting that division) played a part in
our survival as a species, see Richard D. Horan et al., How Trade Saved Humanity from Biological Exclusion: An Economic Theory of Neanderthal Extinction, 58 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 1 passim (2005).
22. Theodore C. Bergstrom, A Survey of Theories of the Family, in 1A
HANDBOOK OF POPULATION AND FAMILY ECONOMICS 21, 59–62 (Mark R. Rosenzweig & Oded Stark eds., 1997).
23. Jon Elster & George Loewenstein, Utility from Memory and Anticipation, in CHOICE OVER TIME 213, 213–15, 223–28 (George Loewenstein & Jon
Elster eds., 1992).
24. For a recent empirical analysis, see Wojciech Kopczuk & Joseph P.
Lupton, To Leave or Not to Leave: The Distribution of Bequest Motives, 74 REV.
ECON. STUD. 207 passim (2007) (finding that households with bequest motives
spend significantly less on lifetime consumption). For references to earlier discussions, see Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 7–9. For judicial acknowledgements, see Licata v. Spector, 225 A.2d 28, 30 (Conn. C.P. 1966); Wogan v.
Small, 11 Serg. & Rawle 141, 145 (Pa. 1824) (“[F]reedom of disposition by last
will . . . is one of the greatest excitements to enterprise and industry.”).
25. Still, the marginal impact of interdependent utilities on productivity
and saving is tempered by the benefactor’s simultaneous regard for self. GARY
S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 282, 284 (1976).
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simultaneously give rise to a virtual market for reciprocal altruistic transfers, beneficiaries providing social services that
benefactors value in implicit exchange for a share of their estates.26 In theory, beneficiaries could offer those same services
within a contract-based market, but cultural taboos inhibit explicit exchanges within families and other social networks.27
What is more, the very offer of services for sale can alter their
social nature, paradoxically reducing the utility of transferors,
and also sometimes cheapening the services’ value to recipients.28 In the language of economics, things given and things
sold are imperfect substitutes.
But cf. Louis Kaplow, Utility from Accumulation, NAT’L TAX ASSOC., PROC.
102ND ANN. CONF. (forthcoming 2011) (suggesting that self-regard can encourage saving). This regard has figured in several popular works on inheritance aimed at the “Me” generation. ELMER OTTE, INHERIT YOUR OWN MONEY
(1978); STEPHEN M. POLLAN & MARK LEVINE, DIE BROKE (1998). For an early
discussion, see DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 486–87 (P.H.
Nidditch ed., Oxford Press 2d ed. 1978) (1739–1740) (observing that individuals embedded within families exhibit a mixture of altruism and selfishness).
For a further psychological insight into saving behavior, see Wojciech Kopczuk
& Joel Slemrod, Denial of Death and Economic Behavior, 5 ADVANCES
THEORETICAL ECON., no. 1, 2005, available at http://www.bepress.com/bejte/
advances/vol5/iss1/art5.
26. Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 9–11 (citing to prior discussions). For
a further discussion, see Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance and Bankruptcy: The
Meaning of the Fresh Start, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 175, 211–14 (1994). For an early
discussion recognizing both rationales, see BENTHAM, supra note 14, at 531
(“In this way, value is created, as it were, out of nothing.”). For an early spoof
of the phenomenon within popular culture, see BEN JONSON, VOLPONE (Alvin
B. Kernan & Richard B. Young eds., Yale Univ. Press 1962) (first performed as
a stage play in 1606).
27. For a historical discussion, see William I. Miller, Gift, Sale, Payment,
Raid: Case Studies in the Negotiation and Classification of Exchange in Medieval Iceland, 61 SPECULUM 18, 21–25, 42, 46–50 (1986). For economic and
social interpretations, see Rachel E. Kranton, Reciprocal Exchange: A SelfSustaining System, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 830 passim (1996) (arguing that reciprocal altruism and exchange tend to be mutually exclusive and pathdependent); Offer, supra note 5, at 454 (noting the preference against cash as
a medium of inter vivos reciprocal altruism, which would make the transfer
appear “too much like a wage”). Taboos against formal exchange are occasionally explored, once again, within popular culture. In a disturbing scene in the
feature film Carnal Knowledge, a mistress complains to her self-absorbed,
emotionally distant paramour, played by Jack Nicholson (who else?), that,
ensconced in his apartment, she has no life and no career. In an extended soliloquy, he angrily responds by offering to employ her—paying her fixed dollar
amounts for each type and item of household service that she performs for him
within the apartment. CARNAL KNOWLEDGE (AVCO Embassy Pictures 1971).
28. PETER M. BLAU, EXCHANGE AND POWER IN SOCIAL LIFE 112 (1964);
STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 223–24 (2004) (“[P]art of the value of a
gift lies in the fact that it is given as a gift . . . . The expression of [donative]
intent is considered valuable in and of itself.”); RICHARD TITTMUS, THE GIFT
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Of course, only the stoniest of hearts views an estate plan
exclusively as a medium of exchange. And if the state does not
intend to confiscate property upon the deaths of its owners, it
must devolve according to some plan of distribution to survivors. Assuming a family is tied together by bonds of affection,
leaving estate plans to owners’ discretion exploits their knowledge (and hence their comparative advantage as contrasted
with legislators or courts) to devise a plan that enhances the
family’s welfare.29 By analogy, what Dean Roscoe Pound called
“contractual dirigism”30—a command economy in which the
state orders industrial exchange—would squander the knowledge that market signals provide and again lessen the welfare
of society.
As a historical matter, the laws of exchange have tended in
the direction of expanding freedom and hence have evolved
“from [s]tatus to [c]ontract,” in Sir Henry Maine’s celebrated
phrase.31 We can discern an analogous trend from status-based
rights of inheritance toward unfettered testation.32 It is easy to
generalize today that “[t]he organizing principle of the American law of donative transfers is freedom of disposition.”33 Still
and all, neither freedom of contract nor freedom of testation
has ever become absolute under our law.34 Each has its limits,
RELATIONSHIP 263–64 (Ann Oakley & John Ashton eds., 1997); Offer, supra
note 5, at 454. And vice versa: just as cultural taboos may require exchanges
to be clothed as gifts, decorum sometimes demands that the benefactor dress
up a gift as a contract. Miller, supra note 27, at 22. The social more against
gifting typically arises in situations where an act of charity would cause the
recipient to lose status. See BOULDING, supra note 5, at 26 .
29. Hirsch and Wang, supra note 5, at 12 (citing to prior discussions).
30. ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 161–
63 (rev. ed. 1954) (borrowing the phrase from French jurists).
31. HENRY S. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 172–74 (Frederick Pollock ed., J. Murray 10th ed. 1920) (1897).
32. See J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 284 –
94, 435–37 (1990) (describing early legal currents); RAY D. MADOFF,
IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW 5–11 (2010) (noting modern trends). For an example of a limitation on freedom of testation that has become extinct, see Shirley
N. Jones, The Demise of Mortmain in the United States, 12 MISS. C. L. REV.
407 passim (1992). But cf. infra note 281 (concerning trust law).
33. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmt. a (2003).
34. See McKean v. Warburton, 919 So. 2d 341, 344 (Fla. 2005) (“It is an
elementary principle that a person can dispose of his or her property by will as
he or she pleases so long as that person’s intent is not contrary to any principle
of law or public policy.” (emphasis added)). Likewise: “The power to contract is
not unlimited. While, as a general rule, there is the utmost freedom of action
in this regard, some restrictions are placed upon the right by legislation, by
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in theory and in practice. As the foregoing pages have suggested, rationales for granting freedom of contract and of testation roughly correspond. Do rationales for restricting freedom of
contract and of testation also correspond?
One justification for confining freedom of contract stems
from its dependence on suitable conditions to ensure its proper
exercise. When a market operates imperfectly, unfettered freedom of contract can lead to inefficiency. Thus, an agreement between two contractors might impose a cost on others that they
would pay to avoid. Yet, third parties sometimes cannot bargain with contractors due to coordination impediments or for
other reasons. The market can sustain such an agreement,
even if its spillover costs (also known as negative externalities,
in the parlance of economics) exceed its benefits. Under these
conditions, lawmakers preserve efficiency by restraining freedom of contract.35 Rules barring contracts to commit crimes
represent an obvious example, and various other market regulations also trace to this source. The classic (but not exclusive)
justification for disallowing clauses in contracts for credit that
waive the bankruptcy discharge is that such clauses would
harm family members and burden the state’s welfare apparatus by weakening the incentives of hopelessly insolvent debtors
to labor.36
A second, more controversial, justification for limiting freedom of contract follows not from market failure, but (so to say)
from personal failure. Lawmakers could anticipate that conpublic policy, and by the nature of things.” Sternaman v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.,
62 N.E. 763, 764 (N.Y. 1902). “[C]ontractual freedom is . . . not fundamental to
the notion of the contract . . . . Public order is . . . a constituent aspect thereof,
as it specifies the conditions under which the law recognizes its binding force.”
Jacques Ghestin, The Contract as Economic Trade, in THE ECONOMICS OF
CONTRACTS, supra note 6, at 99, 105–06. For a recognition of limitations on
both freedom of testation and of contract, see MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND
SOCIETY 668, 691–92 (Guenther Roth & Clause Wittich eds., Bedminster Press
1968) (1922). For a comparative geographical study of freedom of testation, see
JENS BECKERT, INHERITED WEALTH 21–82 (Thomas Dunlap trans., Princeton
Univ. Press 2008) (2004).
35. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 178–179 (1981); see id.
§ 178 cmts. b–c (recognizing that the analysis requires a “balancing of interests”); MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 58–77
(1993). An alternative, more flexible response would be to tax contracts that
implicate spillover costs, causing contractors to adjust to actual costs—what
economists call a Pigouvian tax, in honor of the theorist who developed the
concept. See infra note 135.
36. THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW
243–45 (1986).
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tracting parties may come to regret an agreement, either because they will have misjudged what would contribute to their
utility or because they will have failed to take evolving, timeinconsistent preferences into account. Lawmakers might then
take it upon themselves to proscribe a type of contract or term
that they have reason to believe will produce regret systematically.37 Although critics object to this paternalistic response as
either speculative, growth inhibiting, or morally inappropriate
for adults,38 a number of existing laws appear motivated by this
aim. Rules barring the sale of social security and other pension
benefits, for example, protect “myopic”39 employees, those who
discount their future security, from decisions their later selves
would likely condemn.40 At the same time, most if not all such
rules also involve spillover costs (radiating, for example, from
destitution in old age) that comprise a dual policy consideration.41
If paternalism is grounded in utilitarian concerns, other
limitations on freedom of contract are equitable or welfarist in
conception. Lawmakers minded to bring about a “fair” division
of wealth in society may regulate the allocation of gains from
trade in order to achieve what they perceive as distributive justice.42 Regulations of this sort have taken either of two forms.
37. Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE
L.J. 763 passim (1983). Professor Radin argues that rendering inalienable
those aspects of property central to “personhood” is freedom enhancing rather
than paternalistic, for once they are lost the individual forfeits the capacity for
“proper self-development” that is itself essential for freedom. Margaret Jane
Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1898–99 (1987). This
criticism may largely revolve around semantics, for advocates of paternalism
agree that the regret they seek to avert in others can be profoundly demoralizing. E.g., Kronman, supra, at 782.
38. TREBILCOCK, supra note 35, at 147–63; Rochelle Spergel, Note, Paternalism and Contract: A Critique of Anthony Kronman, 10 CARDOZO L. REV.
593, 607–24 (1988). For more general critiques, see, for example, DONALD
VANDEVEER, PATERNALISTIC INTERVENTION 69–70 (1986); Danny Scoccia, Paternalism and Respect for Autonomy, 100 ETHICS 318 passim (1990).
39. On the phenomenon of myopia (also known as akrasia or hyperbolic
discounting in the nomenclature of cognitive psychology), see, for example,
JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 470–83 (3d ed. 2000).
40. Deborah M. Weiss, Paternalistic Pension Policy: Psychological Evidence and Economic Theory, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1299, 1317–18 (1991). For
additional references, see Adam J. Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts and Public Policy: Economic and Cognitive Perspectives, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 23 & n.78 (1995).
41. See Kronman, supra note 37, at 764 (acknowledging this common
duality).
42. For the seminal discussion, see Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law
and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472 passim (1980); see also Kronman,
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Some rules operate across the board to police specific relationships where lawmakers apprehend a danger of systematic distributive inequities resulting from unequal bargaining power.
Hence, rules limiting interest rates for loans, requiring warrantees of habitability, or setting minimum wages regulate contractual relations between creditor and debtor, landlord and
tenant, employer and employee, shifting wealth in each instance from the first group to the second.43 Alternatively, lawmakers can enforce equitable limits on freedom of contract
case-by-case. The defense of substantive unconscionability appears premised on the notion that when contracts become too
“one-sided,” possibly for that reason alone, but more clearly
when the party disproportionately enriched also has less need,
they produce distributive injustice.44
Turning, by comparison, to freedom of testation, one rationale for narrowing contractual freedom has no general bearing:
paternalism cannot underlie a critique of testamentary liberty.
A will takes effect only after a testator dies. Once that event occurs, lawmakers need fret no longer about the testator’s wellbeing; the dead lose their capacity either to regret or, for that
matter, to celebrate their decisions. Paternalism could hold merit for parties who would otherwise kick themselves (including,
perhaps, beneficiaries).45 Decedents just spin in their graves.
At the same time, testamentary transfers do have distributive consequences that commentators sometimes condemn as
supra note 37, at 771–72. Dean Kronman propounds a normative defense of
this use of contract law both within the parameters of liberal political theory
and even libertarian theory. For a response to the second claim, see Larry Alexander & William Wang, Natural Advantages and Contractual Justice, 3
LAW & PHIL. 281 passim (1984).
43. Kronman, supra note 42, at 473. But see TREBILCOCK, supra note 35,
at 252–53 (questioning the need for regulation so long as businesses of comparable size and power compete with each other to trade with consumers).
44. Aditi Bagchi, Distributive Injustice and Private Law, 60 HASTINGS L.J.
105, 135–36 (2008) (“While the doctrine of unconscionability is not explicitly
framed in distributive terms, its distributive aspects have been often noted
. . . . [C]ourts usually do not apply the doctrine to the benefit of rich victims.”).
On the doctrine of substantive unconscionability, see generally Melvin Aron
Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741, 748–
85 (1982); Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s
New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 509–17 (1967).
45. For a further discussion, see Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 26.
Nonetheless, limitations on the right to make inter vivos gifts, concerning
which the donor’s capacity to regret remains intact, could be premised on paternalism. For discussions, see E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CHANGING YOUR MIND
143–47 (1998); E. Allan Farnsworth, Promises and Paternalism, 41 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 385 passim (2000).
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unjust.46 The injustice in these instances flows from the distribution not of net gains, but of gross receipts, in relation to
preexisting inequalities. Likewise, testamentary transfers
sometimes implicate market failures that lawmakers and
commentators cite to justify constraints on freedom of testation.
In sum, although the problems of freedom of contract and
freedom of testation are not identical, they do appear closely
enough connected to make comparative analysis a useful exercise. To the extent that substantive asymmetries between the
boundaries of each freedom emerge, they demand either justification or rectification within a consolidated theory of freedom of
transfer. There remains, though, a second and even more important correspondence to bear in mind—one of substitutability, as opposed to analogy. A contract resembles a will sufficiently that one can sometimes replace the other; a testator could
look to either as a tool of estate planning. To the extent contracts and wills can perform equivalent functions, asymmetric
restrictions on freedom of transfer become not merely inconsistent, but incompatible. As such, they are also inequitable, allowing the better counseled to accomplish through clever exploitation of instrumental “loopholes” what the more poorly counseled cannot. These asymmetries should carry an indelible
mark of illegitimacy.
Let us keep all of this in view as we turn to a more detailed
examination of freedom of testation and its limits.
II. FORBIDDEN CONDITIONS
A. PERSONAL CONDUCT
A testator may saddle a bequest with conditions. So long as
the beneficiary fulfills a condition, he or she can receive the inheritance (either as a delayed lump sum or as a continuing income stream). Otherwise, the beneficiary forfeits the interest.
Conditional bequests are ordinarily valid—but not always. If
46. To be sure, the very institution of inheritance is open to criticism within liberal political theory. Cf., e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN
THE LIBERAL STATE 201–07 (1980); D.W. Haslett, Distributive Justice and Inheritance, in IS INHERITANCE LEGITIMATE? 133 passim (Guido Erreygers &
Toon Vandevelde eds., 1997); Michael B. Levy, Liberal Equality and Inherited
Wealth, 11 POL. THEORY 545 passim (1983). The instant analysis accepts that
institution as a given and considers only the distributive consequences of freedom of testation within a legal system that permits private inheritance of
property by successive generations.
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the condition entails conduct “contrary to public policy or violative of some rule of law,” the condition is void.47 Thus, a condition attached to a bequest requiring the beneficiary to commit a
crime is invalid.48 This much is readily justifiable as avoiding
spillover costs. The rule shadows one within contract law, voiding contracts that call for or comprise the commission of
crimes.49
Intriguingly, lawmakers have gone farther. As elaborated
in the Restatement of Property, if a testator conditions a bequest on the beneficiary’s marital decisions, the condition may
fail. The issue hinges on whether or not the condition was intended “unreasonably [to] limit the . . . opportunity to marry.”50
A conditional bequest intended to encourage separation or divorce likewise fails.51 At the same time, a conditional bequest
designed to influence religious affiliation, or personal habits
(such as abstemiousness), or pursuit of an education or a particular occupation is valid, according to the Restatement.52
Although less detailed in its treatment, the Restatement of
Contracts tracks these limitations.53 That is as it should be, for
conditional bequests are not true gratuities at all. Like a contract, they require performance of a quid pro quo. Considered
structurally, in fact, we may just as well describe a conditional
bequest as a unilateral contract offer made at death. No reason
appears why a contract offer made during life, calling for per47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 5.1 (1983).
The third Restatement of Property fails to revisit the problem, although it acknowledges generally the doctrine limiting “unreasonable restraints on
. . . marriage.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmt. c (2003). The third Restatement of Property also endorses
the “[p]ublic policy . . . limit[s] [on the] freedom of disposition” set out in the
third Restatement of Trusts, discussed infra notes 65, 72 and accompanying
text, although the third Restatement of Property contains no express proposal
to duplicate those limits and apply them to conditional bequests out of trust.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS div.
VIII, scope of div. VIII (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2010) (approved May 2010).
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 5.1 cmt. c
(1983).
49. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 512 (1932); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981).
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2 (1983).
The limitation only applies to conditions that continue postmortem. A condition that a beneficiary must meet before the death of the testator is indistinguishable from a threat of disinheritance and hence is per se valid. Id. § 6.1
cmt. c & illus. 5; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. i(2) (2003).
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 7.1 (1983).
52. Id. §§ 8.1–.3.
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 189–190 (1981).
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formance that could continue after death, should be judged according to a different standard.
It is therefore striking, and sadly typical, that as concerns
void terms and conditions, neither the Restatement of Contracts nor the Restatement of Property ever once crossreferences the other. Rather than analogize contractual restraints on marriage to testamentary ones, the Restatement of
Contracts analogizes the problem to restraints on trade, covered elsewhere in the same Restatement.54 Model lawmakers
working in the areas of contracts and wills have launched doctrinal ships in the night. That the two have managed nonetheless to chart an approximately parallel course testifies to lawmakers’ like-mindedness concerning these problems. Still,
when lawmakers sail along independently, some scattering becomes predictable. Their doctrines have drifted apart in a number of respects, as reflected in the two Restatements.
One inconsistency involves the scope of permissible restraints. Under both Restatements a comprehensive restraint
on any first marriage is invalid.55 Both Restatements also agree
that the validity of partial restraints on first marriages depends on their reasonability. But in the course of elaborating
this characteristic, the two Restatements offer illustrations
that appear to conflict. For instance, under the Restatement of
Property, a condition in a bequest to a sixty-year-old unmarried
sister that she not marry before the age of eighty is invalid.56
By comparison, under the Restatement of Contracts a condition
not to marry in a contract between a fifty-year-old unmarried
niece, promising housekeeping services, and her seventy-yearold uncle, promising a payment upon his death, is reasonable
54. Id. § 189 cmt. a. Nevertheless, some commentators, along with the occasional court, have spied the categorical analogy. See Estate of Robertson,
859 N.E.2d 772, 775–76 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007); see also Cooke v. Turner, (1846)
153 Eng. Rep. 1044, 1047 (L.R. Exch.); 15 M. & W. 727, 736; 2 JOHN NORTON
POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 933, at 1955 (4th ed.
1918) (“intimately connected . . . and depending upon the same principle”); 7
SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 16:17, at 429–
30 (Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 1997). The third Restatement of Trusts, covering a category straddling contracts and property, refers to provisions on conditions found in the Restatements of both of those subjects, see RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmts. i(2), j (2003), although the Restatement of Trusts
declines to follow either. See infra note 65.
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.1(1)
(1983); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 189 illus. 1 (1981) (by implication).
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2 illus. 6
(1983).
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and hence effective.57 Although the probability that such a contract would continue to bind the fifty-year-old until the age of
eighty is doubtless small,58 the two restraints seem roughly
comparable.
Of course, reasonability is a standard, and dueling illustrations in a contractual and testamentary setting do not imply
that a court must read and apply the two standards differently;
by their nature, standards are fuzzy. The Restatements part
company more tangibly, however, in two other respects. One
concerns the relevance of motivation. The Restatement of Contracts follows an objective standard of reasonability, never taking into consideration why a party to the contract imposed the
condition.59 By contrast, the Restatement of Property follows a
subjective standard. A bequest conditioned on not marrying
takes effect without the condition only “[a]bsent any admissible
evidence as to [the testator’s] motive.”60 Were evidence to disclose a “dominant motive” simply to provide support until marriage, the condition would remain valid.61
The other discrepancy concerns the consequences of invalidity. Under the Restatement of Property, when the court finds
a condition void, the bequest remains effective and becomes unconditional.62 By contrast, under the Restatement of Contracts,
the court can either invalidate the condition and excuse its
nonperformance but still enforce the other party’s promise or
invalidate the entire contract, depending on whether the court
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 189 illus. 2 (1981).
58. According to the Social Security Administration’s 2006 actuarial
tables, the average life expectancy of a man of seventy is 13.55 years. Period
Life Table, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/STATS/table4c6
.html (last visited April 27, 2011).
59. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 189–190 (1981). The
Restatement cites approvingly a case expressly distinguishing its objective approach from a subjective one. Id. § 190 reporter’s note to cmt. a (citing In re
Marriage of Dawley, 551 P.2d 323, 328 (Cal. 1976)).
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.1 illus. 1
(1983).
61. Id. § 6.1(2) & cmt. e; see also id. §§ 6.2 cmts. g–h, 6.3 cmt. f & illus. 7,
7.1 & cmt. d, 7.2 & cmts. d–e, 8.1 cmt. d, 8.2 cmt. c, 8.3 cmt. d (applying subjective analysis to other conditions); cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 189 cmt. a (1981) (allowing contracts that objectively “serve
some purpose other than that of merely discouraging marriage”).
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.1(1) &
cmt. d & illus. 8 (1983); see also, e.g., Home For Incurables of Balt. City v.
Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 797 A.2d 746, 751 (Md. 2002). Some early cases
invalidated the entire bequest, however. Olin L. Browder, Illegal Conditions
and Limitations: Effect of Illegality, 47 MICH. L. REV. 759, 760–62 (1949).
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finds that the unenforceable condition “was [or was not] an essential part of the agreed exchange.”63 If the void condition,
such as not marrying, comprised the sole consideration for the
transfer, then the court presumably would find the contract
invalid and not enforce the transfer.64
These asymmetries aside, we may question the soundness
of limitations on the validity of conditional transfers of this
sort. Those limitations have now been cast into sharp relief by
the promulgation of still another Restatement project, the third
Restatement of Trusts. In contrast to the second Restatements
of Property and Contracts, and contrary to most of the case law,
this new Restatement would broadly invalidate trust conditions
restraining marriage, divorce, religious practice, and occupation—thereby cutting back on the current latitude of freedom of
testation.65
The rationale articulated in the Restatements of Property
and Contracts for limits on the validity of marital conditions is
the public policy in favor of ensuring that citizens have an opportunity to marry. As expressed in the Restatement of Contracts, “the freedom of individuals to marry should not be impaired except for good reason.”66 As reiterated in the

63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 185 & cmt. b (1981).
64. Compare McCoy v. Flynn, 151 N.W. 465, 468 (Iowa 1915) (holding that
a party who had fulfilled a promise not to marry for three years in exchange for
a promised payment of $5000 could not recover under the invalid contract), with
King v. King, 59 N.E. 111, 112 (Ohio 1900) (holding that a party who had fulfilled a promise to provide caregiving services for the second party and not to
marry during the second party’s lifetime was enforceable against the second party, even though the term in the contract restraining marriage was void, because
that term comprised “a mere incident to the main purpose” of the contract).
65. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 & cmts. i–l (2003); cf.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 62 & cmts. b–j (1959) (giving greater deference to testamentary intent). The position taken by the third Restatement of
Trusts is adopted by the Uniform Trust Code, see UNIF. TRUST CODE § 404
cmt. (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 484 (2006), and several non-Uniform state
statutes. Because only trusts fall within the remit of this Restatement, a testator can create a conditional bequest out of trust in order to avoid its potential application. The case law, however, has not traditionally distinguished the
treatment of conditions in and out of trust. 2 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT ET AL.,
SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS §§ 9.3.5–.8 (5th ed. 2006); see also In re Estate
of Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d 888, 895, 902 (Ill. 2009) (observing, in a marital restriction case not directly concerned with a trust, that “[t]he public policy of
the state of Illinois . . . is . . . one of broad testamentary freedom,” and that
“[w]e have not yet had reason to consider whether any section of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts . . . is an accurate expression of Illinois law”).
66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 189 cmt. a (1981).
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Restatement of Property, “coercing abstention from marriage”
via a gratuitous transfer is “socially undesirable.”67
Taken literally, this rationale should lead toward doctrinal
qualifications that fail to emerge from the case law. Under this
theory, only conditions unreasonably proscribing marriage
could potentially violate public policy; those prescribing marriage should not. Thus, consider a bequest conditioned on not
marrying outside a particular group—typically, but not necessarily, adherents of a specified religious faith. The Restatement
of Property offers as its example a bequest of income “to my son
S for life, provided that, if he ever marries a person not of the
Catholic faith” the income interest terminates.68 The Restatement would give effect to such a condition so long as the number of permitted marital partners is sufficiently large as to
make marriage realistically possible, and so long as the beneficiary’s own beliefs (such as devotion to a different faith) will not
preclude marriage to one of those permitted partners.69 This
approach follows logically from the Restatement’s rationale70
and could be extended to proscriptions of marriage to persons
outside a given ethnic group or, in the twenty-first century, to
persons of a given gender.
Yet, suppose the bequest were worded differently: income
to S for life “if he marries a person of the Catholic faith.” Thus
framed, the bequest creates an incentive to marry a Catholic,
but creates no disincentive to marry anyone else; a beneficiary
who abstains from marriage receives the same treatment as
one who marries a Protestant. Such a condition should not vi67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.1 cmt. a
(1983).
68. Id. § 6.2 illus. 3.
69. Id. § 6.2 cmts. a, c, f & illus. 3. For case law, see Maddox v. Maddox’s
Adm’r, 52 Va. (11 Gratt.) 804, 808–09 (1854).
70. One of the Restatement’s illustrations appears flawed, however. It addresses the scenario of a bequest to a daughter to be forfeited if she ever marries a named person, leaving a nearly universal set of permitted marital partners. Nevertheless, the Restatement posits, if the daughter was engaged to
that named person when the bequest matured, the condition is void, because
in that event “a marriage permitted by the restraint was not likely to occur.”
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2 illus. 1 (1983).
But see Graydon’s Ex’rs v. Graydon, 23 N.J. Eq. 229, 236–38 (Ch. 1872) (holding to the contrary), rev’d on other grounds, 25 N.J. Eq. 561 (1874). What a
sentimental notion! If the beneficiary is prevailed upon to break her engagement, the illustration assumes, she is unlikely to marry anyone else. More realistically, the circumstance of engagement to a forbidden partner does not make
marriage by the beneficiary improbable—it simply makes her willingness to
carry out the condition improbable.
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olate public policy, at least as propounded by the Restatement.
The case law, however, fails to distinguish proscriptive and
prescriptive conditions, assessing both under a reasonability
standard.71
This being so, the cases appear to reflect a more farreaching public policy than the one indicated in the Restatements: a policy not to favor marriage, strictly speaking, but to
favor marital choice. As concerns a decision so personal as marriage, lawmakers wish citizens to be free from “unreasonable”
interference by third parties, which would include incentives
they create either to remain unmarried or to marry within
closely confined groups. The third Restatement of Trusts
adopts this position and expands it to cover most marital conditions. To give effect to these conditions would allow the testator
to “exert[] a socially undesirable influence on the exercise or
nonexercise of fundamental rights that significantly affect the
personal lives of beneficiaries and often of others as well.”72
Nevertheless, in assessing the public policy of all conditional bequests, we must remember that the influence they exert comes in the shape of a blandishment, and not a shotgun.
The weddings (or bachelorhoods) that ensue stem not from
coercion, but from the beneficiary’s appraisal of what matters
more to him or her—money or matrimonial preference.73 If
71. The Restatement’s illustrations cover only proscriptions of marriage.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2 illus. 1–3
(1983); cf. In re Silverstein’s Will, 155 N.Y.S.2d 598, 599 (Sur. Ct. 1956) (prescriptive condition held valid if “reasonable”); Shapira v. Union Nat’l Bank,
315 N.E.2d 825, 826, 828–29 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1974) (same); In re Estate of
Keffalas, 233 A.2d 248, 250–51 (Pa. 1967) (upholding one prescriptive condition, but striking down another that encouraged divorce). No published cases
have tested the validity of a condition proscribing marriage to anyone but a
named person, or, by contrast, of a condition prescribing marriage to a named
person, so their respective legality remains uncertain. Some courts have distinguished the validity of conditions on the basis of their technical form. The
Restatement criticizes these distinctions, as have many courts. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.1 cmt. b & reporter’s note 3
(1983); see also, e.g., Pacholder v. Rosenheim, 99 A. 672, 674 (Md. 1916); Winters v. Miller, 261 N.E.2d 205, 208 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1970) (“a purely semantic whimsy”).
72. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 & cmt. i (2003). This statement
is generally applicable to marital conditions, religious conditions, and occupational conditions. See id. § 29 cmt. i(2). The third Restatement retains a reasonability standard but redefines it to bar all religious restrictions on marriage,
although restrictions on underage marriage continue to be deemed reasonable.
See id. § 29 cmt. j & illus. 2–3.
73. In this connection, the case law uniformly denies that marital conditions in wills raise constitutional issues under Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
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lawmakers deem this sort of bargain undesirable, they must
address the nature of its undesirability—what is it about the
bargain that justifies interference with freedom of transfer?
Surely, it is not enough to say that the condition imposes a
cost, at least by comparison to an unconditional bequest. As in
connection with other bargains, this cost is offset by the utility
benefactors gain from performance of a condition, which they
forfeit when confined to making unconditional bequests. All
else being equal, the bargain is Pareto optimal; whenever the
cost to a beneficiary exceeds the value on offer, he or she will
simply decline the bequest.
Nor is social disapproval of tyrannical conditions an adequate basis for intrusions by government upon freedom of
transfer. As one court put the matter arrestingly, “a man’s prejudices are a part of his liberty.”74 Freedom of transfer brings
economic benefits. When lawmakers mind people’s business for
reasons other than market failures, business suffers. And,
whether we like it or not, the incentives created by a conditional bequest are indistinguishable from other mercenary considerations that might factor into a person’s decision to marry, or
to forebear from marrying, a potential partner.75
(1948). See, e.g., In re Estate of Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d 888, 904 –05 (Ill. 2009);
Shapira, 315 N.E.2d at 827–28 (citing Gordon v. Gordon, 124 N.E.2d 228
(Mass. 1955) and U.S. Nat’l Bank v. Snodgrass, 275 P.2d 860 (Or. 1954)); see
also In re Kempf ’s Will, 297 N.Y.S. 307, 312 (App. Div. 1937) (observing that a
conditional bequest setting forth religious affiliation conditions could have
been declined on conscience grounds), aff’d, 16 N.E.2d 123 (1938) (per curiam);
In re Estate of Laning, 339 A.2d. 520, 525–26 (Pa. 1975) (same).
74. Keffalas, 233 A.2d at 250 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). See also infra notes 144 –47, 158 and accompanying text.
75. See Chaachou v. Chaachou, 73 So. 2d 830, 838 (Fla. 1954) (“If marriage for convenience and business reasons is sufficient to hold the agreement
illegal, it might be hard to sustain the legality of countless thousands of marriages.”); Piper v. Hoard, 13 N.E. 626, 629 (N.Y. 1887) (“Marriage has its sentimental and its business sides.”). As empirical evidence shows, rich persons
have small difficulty finding marital partners. See Gary Burtless, Effects of
Growing Wage Disparities and Changing Family Composition on the U.S. Income Distribution, 43 EUR. ECON. REV. 853, 856 tbl.2 (1999) (showing marriage rates as correlated with higher earnings). Once again, popular culture
has often depicted or parodied these social verities. See, e.g., A NEW LEAF
(Aries Productions 1971); HOW TO MARRY A MILLIONAIRE (20th Century Fox
Corp. 1953); cf. THE DEVIL AND MISS JONES (Frank Ross-Norma Krasna Inc.
1941) (reversing the formula, for comic effect, into an aversion to marrying
wealth). For a further parody offered in connection with a conditional bequest,
see BERNARD SHAW, The Devil’s Disciple, in THREE PLAYS FOR PURITANS 3, 22
(New York, Brentano’s 1906) (1897). Needless to add, these influences move
men and women alike. See, e.g., SARAH BRADFORD, AMERICA’S QUEEN 67–68
(2000) (noting Jacqueline Bouvier’s pursuit of wealth through marriage); Mar-
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One conceivable ground for invalidating marital conditions
is the prospect of errors of judgment—that is, the risk that beneficiaries will in time regret fulfilling a marital condition in order to obtain a bequest. Unlike testators, beneficiaries accepting conditions that from their perspective are inter vivos can
profit from paternalistic protection, if lawmakers deem it warranted.76 Still, marital decisions are reversible, making the regret associated with them transitory. If a beneficiary regrets a
“convenient” marriage, or bachelorhood, as an error in judgment, he or she can still take steps to redress the error.
Another possible ground for invalidating marital conditions
is their potential inefficiency when they generate spillover
costs—what the third Restatement of Trusts refers to in plainer
language as the adverse impact of conditions on the “lives of
beneficiaries and often of others as well.”77 The fact remains
that when a condition bars marriage, no individual apart from
the beneficiary directly experiences the consequences. Perhaps
freedom to marry implicates a kind of network effect by increasing the likelihood that others can discover a preferred
partner; vice versa, impediments to marriage reduce that likelihood. But so long as conditions restraining marriage remain
relatively uncommon, leaving a large universe of available
partners, the effect should be negligible.
Other possible costs merit attention. English courts identified state interests as the original public policy against conditions restraining marriage, namely the political imperative of
demographic growth—plainly an archaic notion today.78 Modern economists contemplating marriage as an institution associate with it various private efficiencies but no social benefits
lost by abstention from marriage.79 At the same time, sociologo Howard, The Warner Touch, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 7, 1983, at 9, 9 (noting
the same pursuit by the young John Warner, who married a Mellon and became a U.S. senator).
76. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. Conditional bequests may
themselves stem from testators’ efforts to paternalize beneficiaries, encouraging choices that testators believe will serve beneficiaries’ best interests. Robert
A. Pollak, Tied Transfers and Paternalistic Preferences, 78 AM. ECON. REV.
(PAPERS & PROC.) 240, 240–44 (1988).
77. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. i (2003) (emphasis added);
see also supra text accompanying note 72.
78. Olin Browder, Jr., Conditions and Limitations in Restraint of Marriage, 39 MICH. L. REV. 1288, 1288–89 (1941).
79. The efficiencies of marriage involve the division of labor within families, risk pooling, and economies of scale. GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE
FAMILY 30–79 (enlarged ed. 1991); WILLIAM A. LORD, HOUSEHOLD DYNAMICS
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gists posit benefits of marriage that are more dispersed and
hence of potential interest to lawmakers. Studies suggest that
unmarried persons—“bare branches” in a Chinese idiom80—are
more likely to commit crime or to enter unstable substrata of
society,81 a predicament that can occur naturally by virtue of
unbalanced sex ratios that now loom in some Asian countries,82
resulting in a “marriage squeeze.”83 In the instant case, though,
a beneficiary subject to an artificial marriage squeeze receives
a transfer in compensation for remaining unmarried. This aggrandizement of economic status should tend to counteract
whatever social hazards attend his or her marital status.
A condition that encourages marriage within a prescribed
group fails even to implicate social hazards. Such a condition
could affect the happiness of marital partners whom beneficiaries would not otherwise have agreed to marry, yet those partners—like beneficiaries themselves—embark upon marriage
willingly and with their eyes open. A testamentary condition
that functions to encourage divorce, on the other hand, does entail spillover costs, at least if there are children of the marriage.84 Lawmakers may nevertheless treat those costs as functionally internal, assuming the inheriting spouse has inter288–92 (2002). Marriage also contributes to health and longevity, with secondary ramifications for the social welfare system that have yet to be examined,
and which do not necessarily yield a net economic gain (given the potential
costliness of longevity). LINDA J. WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR
MARRIAGE 47–64 (2000). Preliminary empirical research also suggests that
marriage increases the rate of household saving, which affects the national
economy, although the optimal level of national saving remains a controversial
point among economists. Joseph P. Lupton & James P. Smith, Marriage, Assets, and Savings, in MARRIAGE AND THE ECONOMY 129 passim (Shoshana A.
Grossbard-Shechtman ed., 2003).
80. VALERIE M. HUDSON & ANDREA M. DEN BOER, BARE BRANCHES 4,
187–88 (2004).
81. Id. at 229–41; LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES 119–21
(2006); S. Alexandra Burt et al., Does Marriage Inhibit Antisocial Behavior?
An Examination of Selection vs Causation via a Longitudinal Twin Design, 67
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1309, 1313–15 (2010) (citing to earlier studies);
Steven F. Messner & Robert J. Sampson, The Sex Ratio, Family Disruption,
and Rates of Violent Crime: The Paradox of Demographic Structure, 69 SOC.
FORCES 693, 705–08 (1991).
82. See supra note 80.
83. H.V. Muhsam, The Marriage Squeeze, 11 DEMOGRAPHY 291 passim
(1974).
84. Sociologists have debated how serious those costs are; some scholars
maintain that the harm to children caused by divorce is merely transient. The
debate is summarized, and the dueling scholarship cited, in JAMES Q. WILSON,
THE MARRIAGE PROBLEM 7–11, 166–75 (2002).
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dependent utilities with his or her children and will decide
whether the benefits attendant to inheriting exceed the costs
for the family as a whole. Like marriage, a “divorce of convenience” can find its justification in such a mercenary calculus.85
The same analysis applies when benefactors meddle in beneficiaries’ affairs as concerns selection of a career or devotion to
a religious faith.86 Such conditions, concerning reversible decisions, affect only the utilities of inheriting parties, creating no
spillover costs in the bargain.87 And again, the financial inducements on offer merely blend into the mélange of considerations, mercenary and otherwise, that persuade a beneficiary to
pursue one line of work or another, and even to join one sect or
another.88

85. See Audrey Light & Taehyun Ahn, Divorce as Risky Behavior, 47
DEMOGRAPHY 895, 916–17 (2010) (finding empirical evidence of a correlation
between the propensity to divorce and individual economic risk tolerance); see
also MCCLAIN, supra note 81, at 127–29 (“[A]lthough children in [singleparent] families are at higher risk for certain unfavorable schooling and behavioral outcomes, much of this disadvantage appears to stem from poverty rather
than single parenting as such.”); WILSON, supra note 84, at 169 (“Matters may
be better among the most affluent single moms, but most mothers will suffer a
significant loss of income after they divorce.”).
86. For other sorts of behavioral conditions held valid by courts, see, for
example, Griffin v. Sturges, 40 A.2d 758, 762 (Conn. 1944) (bequest conditioned on abstemiousness); In re Estate of Lewis, 770 A.2d 619, 622–23 (Me.
2001) (bequest conditioned on not harassing other family members).
87. See, e.g., In re Estate of Laning, 339 A.2d 520, 524 (Pa. 1975) (“Inasmuch as the result which the testatrix sought to accomplish—viz., affiliation of
the beneficiaries with her religious faith via a conditional bequest—is neither
illegal, immoral, tortious, or productive of any social evil, we see no basis upon
which she should be denied the power to dispose of her property in this fashion.”). Arguably, voluntary military service produces substantial spillover
benefits for society, and conditions against such service are treated specially
under the Restatement. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 8.3 cmt. e (1983).
88. The suggestion that persons might respond to mercenary incentives
when choosing a religion (as opposed to, or along with, a marital partner)
would hardly surprise a social historian and, once again, is recognized within
popular culture. A song popular in eighteenth-century Britain, The Vicar of
Bray, recounted the career of a clergyman whose protean faith kept evolving to
conform to the theology of each succeeding monarch. With every verse, the
chorus recapitulated the clergyman’s most deeply held conviction:
And this is Law, I will maintain
Unto my Dying Day, Sir,
That whatsoever King shall Reign,
I will be Vicar of Bray, Sir!
Anonymous, The Vicar of Bray, in A COLLECTION OF ENGLISH POEMS: 1660–
1800, at 693, 693–94 (Ronald S. Crane ed., 1932) (emphasis omitted).
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In sum, economic analysis—applicable both to freedom of
contract and freedom of testation—potentially justifies nullification only of conditions that involve irreversible choices or
that entail tangible spillover costs. Viewed dispassionately in
that light, conditions encouraging tortious or criminal conduct
plainly offend public policy; other conditions currently abrogated by law do not. Legal restrictions on those conditions
ought to be relaxed, not—as the third Restatement of Trusts
contemplates—expanded.89 But assuming lawmakers do place
some restriction on conditional bequests, surely their validity
should turn on their objective characteristics, as under the Restatement of Contracts, rather than on their subjective ones, as
under the Restatement of Property.90 Were a testator, for example, to bequeath an income interest to a beneficiary that
terminates upon marriage, under the Restatement of Property
the bequest’s validity hinges on whether the testator’s “dominant motive” was to deter marriage or to provide support until
marriage.91 Yet, the presence or absence of a particular mental
89. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. As currently formulated,
the restrictions found in the Restatement of Property on the validity of marital
conditions appear inconsistent with its rules concerning conditions pertaining
to other personal choices, such as religious faith, of which the Restatement is
more tolerant. In particular, the rules governing marital and religious conditions coexist uneasily. If a beneficiary holds beliefs making marriage to a
Catholic unlikely, and a bequest is conditioned on marrying a Catholic, the
condition is void. Yet, a bequest to the same beneficiary conditioned on becoming a Catholic is valid, according to the Restatement. See supra notes 59–61
and accompanying text. The third Restatement of Trusts would invalidate
both sorts of conditions. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. j & illus.
3, cmt. k (2003).
90. See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text. The third Restatement
of Trusts hedges: “[T]his Section is generally concerned with the objective effects
of a provision rather than with the settlor’s underlying motive(s). Nevertheless, a subjective inquiry into the settlor’s reasons for including a provision in
a trust may be relevant.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. j (2003).
91. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. The subjective test endorsed by the Restatement of Property is confirmed by most of the case law.
See, e.g., Graydon’s Ex’rs v. Graydon, 23 N.J. Eq. 229, 236–37 (Ch. 1872), rev’d
on other grounds, 25 N.J. Eq. 561 (1874); In re Estate of Romero, 847 P.2d 319,
322–23 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993). But see Latorraca v. Latorraca, 26 A.2d 522, 526
(N.J. Ch. 1942) (“[I]n this instance the court cannot, and does not, attempt to
probe testator’s mind and determine his object in making provision for his widow and in terminating her estate upon remarriage.”); In re Estate of Keffalas,
233 A.2d 248, 250 (Pa. 1967) (“We cannot accept the contentions of appellants
that evidence of an actual subjective intent to cause divorce is a prerequisite to
striking down a condition based on divorce.”). Note that the requirement of an
agreement between the parties to a contract is not a factor dictating an objective approach to the consideration of motive, in contradistinction to the meaning of a contract.
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state on the part of the testator has no bearing on the presence
or absence of spillover costs. Subjective considerations are
theoretically anomalous when the problem is viewed through
an economic lens.92 If anything, the case for objectivity is
stronger in respect of bequests than of contracts, given the relative magnitude of the evidentiary obstacles facing the court.
Parties to a contract can testify as to their motives; testators
cannot.
As concerns the consequences of invalidity, the rule announced by the Restatement of Contracts whereby the court
can invalidate either the condition or the contract provides
greater flexibility than the rule established by the Restatement
of Property, which invariably invalidates only the condition,
never the underlying bequest.93 At the same time, the risks of a
flexible rule loom larger in connection with bequests. Once
again, the court cannot quiz the testator (unlike a contracting
party) about his or her preferences in the wake of invalidity,
complicating the evidentiary process and heightening the risk
of fraud. The Restatement of Property avoids this risk by following a fixed default rule (although whether the Restatement
has chosen the optimal default rule remains unclear).94 Even
92. Compare, by analogy, the treatment of bequests for purposes that subserve, rather than disserve, public policy: in judging whether a trust purpose
qualifies as charitable, “the motive of the settlor . . . is immaterial . . . . Even if
the motive . . . is to spite his heirs, the trust is none the less a charitable trust
if the purposes are charitable.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 368 cmt.
d (1959); accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 cmt. a (2003).
93. See supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text. Again, the third Restatement of Trusts hedges: whereas “[o]rdinarily” a court reforms an invalid
conditional interest under a trust by striking the condition but still providing
the interest, “[a] different result may be reached . . . to avoid distorting the
settlor’s underlying general plan for allocating his or her estate . . . .”
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. i(1) (2003).
94. The Restatement’s default rule, invalidating the offensive condition
rather than the whole bequest, is justified in the accompanying comment on
the theory that
[i]f the law were . . . to take away the same economic benefit on the
ground that the restraint, although invalid, was nevertheless a stated
condition to the enjoyment of such benefit, the entire effect of the rule
. . . would be vitiated, and the transferor would merely accomplish the
purpose by another method.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.1 cmt. d (1983).
This analysis is erroneous. If a bequest were void by virtue of an invalid condition, then the intended beneficiary would lose the bequest whether or not he or
she fulfilled the condition, and he or she would have no incentive to do so.
Thus, a rule invalidating the condition and one invalidating the bequest are
equally compatible with public policy, and lawmakers should install the rule
that a majority of testators would prefer. See Hirsch, Default Rules, supra note
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so, the Restatement of Property remains internally inconsistent, in that it allows courts to consider extrinsic evidence
when they reform impossible conditions, as opposed to void
ones.95 Either alternative has its merits, making the issue
double edged.96
All of this is not uncontroversial.97 Indeed, the suggestion
that marital conditions in wills are compatible with public policy has come under challenge by a scholar who, one might suppose, would have inclined toward a laissez-faire approach. Addressing the problem in his treatise on law and economics,
Judge Richard Posner observes that, on their face, legal restrictions on marital conditions “may seem wholly devoid of an economic foundation.”98 Nevertheless, he continues, “the possibilit[y] [of] modification . . . would exist if the gift were inter
vivos rather than testamentary . . . [because the benefactor]
might be persuaded to . . . relax the condition. If the [benefactor] is dead, this kind of ‘recontracting’ is impossible, and the
presumption that the condition is a reasonable one fails.”99
Judge Posner here focuses on another form of market failure to justify restrictions on marital conditions—one having to
do not with spillover costs, but with an internal impediment to
bargaining. Living parties come to terms by negotiating or reasoning with each other; decedents, in the nature of things, respond neither to pleas nor to price signals. This disability, if
significant, would suggest a principled distinction not only between conditional gifts and bequests, but also between contractual terms and conditional bequests. But in fact, the concern
15, at 1039–42. Do most testators who seek to create conditional bequests
deem the property transfer as of primary importance and the condition as secondary, or vice versa? The answer to this question is by no means self-evident
and demands empirical study.
95. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 5.2 &
cmts. a–h (1983).
96. For academic commentary in favor of the flexible approach, see
THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS 415 (2d ed. 1953);
Browder, supra note 62, at 762–67.
97. For academic criticism of the validity of personal conduct conditions in
wills, see Matthew Harding, Some Arguments Against Discriminatory Gifts
and Trusts, OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2011); Jeffrey G. Sherman,
Posthumous Meddling: An Instrumentalist Theory of Testamentary Restraints
on Conjugal and Religious Choices, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1273 passim. For an
academic defense, see Ronald J. Scalise, Jr., Public Policy and Antisocial Testators, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2011).
98. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 18.7, at 548 (7th
ed. 2007).
99. Id.
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extends beyond conditions to all forms of dead-hand control, exerted once a testator becomes deaf to all importunities. Because
the issue transcends conditions, we shall put off analysis of it
until a later part of this Article.100
B. NO-CONTEST CLAUSES
There remains one other type of condition that lawmakers
have cordoned off for special treatment. A testator might provide that beneficiaries forfeit their bequests under a will if they
contest the will’s validity. States have divided over whether
such a “no-contest” or “in terrorem” clause101 is effective. By
statute in two jurisdictions, a no-contest clause is void per se.102
Under the historical common law, though, a no-contest clause
was effective per se,103 and this rule remains in place today in a
minority of states.104 The modern majority rule, established either by statute or by case law, lies in between: under the
second and third Restatements of Property, together with the
Uniform Probate Code, a no-contest clause is void when the
court finds probable cause for the contest. The clause only takes
effect in the absence of probable cause, where the contest comprises a frivolous suit or a strike suit.105
Common-law cases following the historical rule enforcing
no-contest clauses have justified it on the ground that in the
matter of deterrence of will contests “the state has no interest

100. See infra notes 245–79 and accompanying text.
101. Thinking intercategorically, one Canadian court has referred to this as
a “poison pill” clause. Foote Estate (Re) (2007), 431 A.R. 338, para. 9 (Alta.
Q.B.). For a distinctly unconventional form of no-contest clause, see Virginia
Court Voids Norwegian Man’s Will, VA. L. WKLY., Nov. 1, 2004, available at
2004 WLNR 22725297 (noting a testamentary threat to haunt anyone who
challenged the validity of the will).
102. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.517 (West 2010); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-6-2
(West 2011).
103. This view was “represented by the vast preponderance of American
opinion” in 1935. In re Brush’s Estate, 277 N.Y.S. 559, 561 (Sur. Ct. 1935).
104. WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN, JR. ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES
§ 13.3, at 643 & n.81 (4th ed. 2010); T. Jack Challis & Howard M. Zaritsky,
State Survey of No Contest Clauses (Feb. 7, 2011) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author) (reporting that eleven states follow the common-law rule).
105. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-517 (amended 2008), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 161
(1998); id. § 3-905, 8 pt. 2 U.L.A. 272 (1998); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.:
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 9.1 (1983); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS
AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.5 (2003); Challis & Zaritsky, supra note
104 (reporting that thirty states follow the probable cause standard or a similar standard, and also noting various other permutations in other states).
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whatever apart from the interest of the parties themselves.”106
Phrased in more technical language, no spillover costs of the
sort sometimes found in connection with other kinds of conditions appear in this instance. At least one court contrasted nocontest clauses with marital conditions in this regard.107
Meanwhile, testators can deter litigation that might stymie testamentary intent while potentially damaging their posthumous
reputation. In the words of Justice David Brewer:
[C]ontests are commenced wherein not infrequently are brought to
light matters of private life that ought never to be made public, and in
respect to which the voice of the testator cannot be heard either in
explanation or denial, and, as a result, the manifest intention of the
testator is thwarted. It is not strange, in view of this, that testators
have desired to secure compliance with their dispositions of property
and have sought to incorporate provisions which should operate most
powerfully to accomplish that result.108

Justice Brewer grasped intuitively what we would today
call the second-best problem at work here. A no-contest clause
becomes necessary only because of, and to compensate for, the
testator’s ineluctable disappearance, hence his or her inability
to testify at a proceeding challenging the will’s effectiveness, or
to deal with contestants otherwise. But again, the impact of a
no-contest clause is largely confined to the parties contemplating the challenge. If it has any significant spillover effects,
these appear salutary in nature. The clause discourages costly
litigation that the state traditionally subsidizes and that “engenders animosities and arouses hostilities among the kinfolk
of the testator, which may never be put to rest and which contribute to general unhappiness.”109
Defenders of the modern rule nullifying no-contest clauses
where probable cause exists for the contest focus on the possibility that a contest is meritorious—that the will is the product
of incapacity, fraud, undue influence, or some other debility
that will remain hidden if a will contest is successfully suppressed. Indeed, undue influencers or perpetrators of fraud
106. Cooke v. Turner, (1846) 153 Eng. Rep. 1044, 1047 (L.R. Exch.); 15 M.
& W. 727, 736.
107. See id. (“The conditions said to be void . . . are those which restrain a
party from doing some act which it is supposed the state has or may have an
interest to have done. The state, from obvious causes, is interested that its
subjects should marry . . . .”).
108. Smithsonian Inst. v. Meech, 169 U.S. 398, 415 (1898); see also, e.g.,
Rudd v. Searles, 160 N.E. 882, 886 (Mass. 1928) (reiterating this reasoning).
109. Rudd, 160 N.E. at 886. A no-contest clause thus helps to ensure
“peace and harmony of the living.” Id.
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might themselves be responsible for including no-contest clauses in wills executed as a result of their wrongdoing.110 In such
an event, public policy demands that “the jurisdiction of the
court to determine the validity of a donative transfer not be defeated.”111 To rule otherwise would furnish wrongdoers “with a
helpful cover for their wrongful designs.”112 A probable cause
rule for no-contest clauses ostensibly reconciles these policies
by fending off unmeritorious litigation, while at the same time
blocking efforts to avert bona fide challenges.
On first sight, this rule seems ideal. Yet appearances can
deceive, and a number of problems emerge when we examine
the issue more closely.113 One difficulty is simply the rule’s
want of economy. If a no-contest clause were valid per se, then
the case would turn on a single determination: whether or not a
contest succeeds. If it did succeed, then the will would fall, and
the no-contest clause would fall with it. Otherwise the will
would stand and the no-contest clause would take effect. Vice
versa, when a no-contest clause operates only in the absence of
probable cause, and the contestant’s challenge succeeds, then
once again the will and the no-contest clause would fall together. But now, by contrast, if the will were upheld, then the case
would turn on a second determination, namely, whether probable cause for the contest existed. In other words, the probable
cause rule can give rise to an extra layer of litigation, and thus
to additional costs.114
On top of that, we have reason to doubt whether courts will
resolve the issue of probable cause correctly. The difficulty is
that the second determination—whether or not probable cause
110. Olin L. Browder, Jr., Testamentary Conditions Against Contests, 36
MICH. L. REV. 1066, 1073 n.13 (1938).
111. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 8.5 cmt. b (2003).
112. S. Norwalk Trust Co. v. St. John, 101 A. 961, 963 (Conn. 1917); see also, e.g., In re Friend’s Estate, 58 A. 853, 855 (Pa. 1904) (opining that a no-contest
clause, if valid per se, would “intrench [sic] fraud and coercion more securely”).
113. For a prior academic criticism of the probable cause rule, see Martin
D. Begleiter, Anti-Contest Clauses: When You Care Enough to Send the Final
Threat, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 629, 631–48 (1994). For a proposal to retain but modify the probable cause rule to narrow the circumstances under which a nocontest clause is ineffective, see Gerry W. Beyer et al., The Fine Art of Intimidating Disgruntled Beneficiaries with In Terrorem Clauses, 51 SMU L. REV.
225, 261–74 (1998).
114. See, e.g., In re Estate of Shumway, 9 P.3d 1062, 1063–69 (Ariz. 2000)
(appealing the issue of probable cause); Russell v. Wachovia Bank, 633 S.E.2d
722, 725–28 (S.C. 2006) (same).
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existed—follows the initial determination on the merits of the
suit. Psychological studies conducted in an assortment of settings find that when persons review events in hindsight they
tend to conceive of the outcome as obvious and inevitable, a
phenomenon known in the literature as “hindsight bias.”115
Like all cognitive limitations and heuristics, this tendency affects judges too, for they are no less human.116
How might hindsight bias distort the outcome of no-contest
clause cases resolved under the probable cause rule? As defined
in the Restatement, probable cause for a contest exists if, when
viewed through the eyes of “a reasonable person, . . . there was
a substantial likelihood” that the contest would succeed.117 This
rule comes into play only if the contest fails; otherwise, the will
(and all its clauses) are void. So, assuming the contest does fail,
courts examining the contest in hindsight should tend to see it
as having been destined to fail all along. In short, they are likely to find the absence of probable cause, with the result that the
no-contest clause will remain valid. If this tropism exists, then
the probable cause rule—so easy to distinguish in theory—
should in practice lean closer to the historical common-law rule,
which is cheaper to implement.
Putting all of this to one side, how might we examine the
problem comparatively from the perspective of contract law? No
direct analogue to a no-contest clause appears within contracts
because such a clause serves a purpose only if a party is absent

115. For summaries of, and references to, the relevant studies, see BARON,
supra note 39, at 145–46; SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND
DECISION MAKING 35–37 (1993).
116. For scholarly discussions of hindsight bias in other legal contexts, see,
for example, Mitu Gulati et al., Fraud by Hindsight, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 773
(2004); Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV.
777, 799–805 (2001); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of
Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571 (1998); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation?, 79 OR. L. REV.
61, 73–81 (2000). But cf. Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How
Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 24 –29 (2007) (suggesting that
where judges operate within “a web of complex rules” governing the outcome,
such as Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, they can more easily overcome
hindsight bias—a circumstance lacking with regard to no-contest clause jurisprudence); Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251,
1314 –18 (2005) (finding no evidence of judicial hindsight bias in an experimental study based on a Fourth Amendment scenario).
117. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 8.5 cmt. c (2003).
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when issues concerning the transfer’s validity arise.118 Nevertheless, as regards transfers at death we can envision an
equivalent to a no-contest clause that accomplishes the same
purpose via contractual means. Suppose a testator anticipates
a will contest and wishes to forestall it. He or she could include
a no-contest clause in the will. Or, he or she could make a unilateral contract offer to disinherited heirs, promising them a
consideration in exchange for their promise not to contest the
will. Is such a contract binding? Uniformly, the cases hold that
it is.119 Yet, notice how the two strategies coincide: if a testator
leaves potential contestants nothing under a will, a no-contest
clause becomes toothless because would-be contestants have
nothing to lose by bringing the contest. The clause weighs upon
the minds of potential contestants only if the testator does bequeath to them. Then they face a choice between (1) gambling
on litigation, and (2) settling for the certainty of whatever
amount the testator has left them under the will as an alternative to bringing the contest. That sum, offered under the will, is
the functional equivalent of the sum offered by a testator to induce a potential contestant contractually not to contest the will
postmortem. In those jurisdictions that limit the effectiveness
of a no-contest clause, freedom of contract appears broader
than freedom of testation, even though the first can be applied
to the very same purpose as the second. Courts and commentators have remained oblivious to the inconsistency.120 In Florida,
for example, no-contest clauses are void per se by statute.121
Yet, courts enforce contractual waivers of rights to contest
wills, on the theory that “[t]he public policy of . . . Florida
. . . highly favors settlement agreements.”122

118. See supra text accompanying note 109. Thus, no-contest clauses would
serve no purpose within the context of an antemortem probate proceeding,
were that option available to testators. Only a handful of jurisdictions currently permit antemortem probate, however. MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 104,
§ 13.3, at 638–39. The nearest contracts analogue to a no-contest clause is an
arbitration clause, which serves to streamline the process of dispute resolution. Similar sorts of provisions appear occasionally in wills. See Lela P. Love
& Stewart E. Sterk, Leaving More than Money: Mediation Clauses in Estate
Planning Documents, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 539 passim (2008).
119. See infra notes 120, 122.
120. Compare ATKINSON, supra note 96, at 408–10, with id. at 527. Likewise: compare 5 PAGE, supra note 4, § 44.29, at 566–67, with 2 id. § 25.7, at
702–03, and 3 id. § 26.63, at 171.
121. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.517 (West 2010).
122. Hernandez v. Gil, 958 So. 2d 390, 391 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
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Nor is the case any different when a wrongdoer is pulling
the strings, manipulating the testator into inserting a nocontest clause in the will. If the wrongdoer wanted to recreate
the instrumentality of a no-contest clause in a jurisdiction limiting its effectiveness, he or she would not even have to persuade the testator to offer potential contestants a contractual
inducement not to contest. The matter could be handled just as
easily postmortem. Compare the following scenarios:
Scenario # 1:
Exerting undue influence, A, unrelated to the testator, T,
induces T to make A the primary beneficiary under T’s will but
also induces T to include in the will a bequest of $50,000 to B,
T’s heir who would inherit in the absence of a will, coupled with
a no-contest clause.
Scenario # 2:
A induces T to bequeath T’s entire estate to A. B brings
suit challenging the will’s validity on the ground of undue influence. A offers B the sum of $50,000 to settle B’s suit.
The two scenarios are equivalent. B is put to the same
stark choice in each instance between the certainty of $50,000
and the uncertainty of winner-take-all litigation. Yet, in a
probable cause jurisdiction, the validity of the no-contest clause
in the first scenario will depend on the retrospective merits of
the contest. By comparison, the validity of a litigation settlement does not depend on the merits of the suit.
If these scenarios are functionally indistinguishable, then
they ought also to be legally indistinguishable. If they saw fit to
do so, lawmakers could make contracts not to contest wills and
private settlements of disputes about inheritance rights ineffective, or contingent on the absence of probable cause, in order to
ensure—by analogy to the Restatement’s analysis of no-contest
clauses—that “the jurisdiction of the court . . . [is] not . . . defeated.”123 Such a rule would rhyme with one partially or completely invalidating no-contest clauses. On the contrary,
though, lawmakers have acted to facilitate probate settlement,
123. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 8.5 cmt. b (2003).
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whether before or after a contest is brought.124 Apart from
avoiding the “animosities” of estate litigation that at least one
court has labeled socially destructive,125 these agreements
serve to minimize administrative costs, which to some extent
the state would bear.
Once again, the categorical segregation of wills and contracts has created a legal blind spot, even at a point of functional overlap.
III. FORBIDDEN BEQUESTS
Conditional bequests demand lawmakers’ scrutiny because
performance of the condition might affect third parties. In addition, lawmakers have elected to forbid certain unconditional
bequests. Those proscriptions may also hold merit, but only after we establish that the bequests at issue implicate deleterious
collateral consequences.
A. ENEMY ALIENS AND SLAYERS
Suppose a testator makes a bequest to an enemy alien. Because the bequest strengthens the foreign power, lawmakers
have reason to interdict the transfer. For the same reason,
lawmakers often prohibit trading with enemy aliens. Thus, by
federal law today, American citizens can neither bequeath to,
nor contract with, Cuban nationals residing in Cuba.126 Because both sorts of transfers have the same spillover effect they
should be treated alike, as at present they are.127

124. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-912 (amended 2008), 8 pt. 2 U.L.A. 279
(1998) (giving effect to settlement agreements and barring personal representatives from probating wills in spite of them); ATKINSON, supra note 96, at 528–
30 (“[The] law favors the settlement of disputes as to property matters.”).
125. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
126. 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.201, 515.310, 515.327 (2009); OFFICE OF ATT’Y GEN.
FLA., INHERITANCE BY CUBAN NATIONAL, ADVISORY LEGAL OPINION NO. 84 -02
(1984), available at http://www.myfloridalegal.com/ago.nsf/Opinions/1589BD
5973E2CFFF85256584004DDEC4.
127. The only other current national proscription applies to citizens of
North Korea. 31 C.F.R. §§ 500.201, 500.310, 500.327 (2009). Erstwhile proscriptions applicable to citizens of Cambodia and Vietnam were lifted in the
1990s. Id. §§ 500.570, 500.578. A further regulation bars property transfers of
any sort to identified terrorists without restriction as to nationality. Id.
§§ 594.201, 594.312. Because the matter involves foreign relations, state statutes affecting these rights are constitutionally suspect. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 430–41 (1968) (invalidating a state statute limiting the inheritance rights of foreign citizens).
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In a related vein, a will could include a bequest to a beneficiary who proceeds to slay the testator. By statute in the vast
majority of jurisdictions, the bequest is void.128 This rule adjusts the estate plan to the probable intent of the victim in most
instances, for testators rarely wish to provide for their assassins; only the speed of the assault typically stymies formal disinheritance of the slayer.129 Yet, suppose we face the atypical
case. A mortally wounded testator might linger for a time, and
in the aftermath forgive his or her slayer, republishing the original will. Or the testator might include Dr. Kevorkian in his or
her will, in return for assisting in the testator’s suicide. The testator’s intent makes no difference. In the large majority of
states, statutes barring inheritance by a slayer lay down mandatory rules, not default rules of imputed intent.130
Is this restriction on freedom of testation defensible? Here,
no harmful condition is attached to the bequest. It simply provides property to a particular party. Nonetheless, by insistently
rewarding behavior that the state deems criminal, the testator’s choice of bequest itself causes social harm, operating perversely to encourage that behavior. Allowing a testator to override the bar would tend to undermine deterrence.131 In similar
fashion, a contract for life insurance that expressly pays off
even if the insured commits suicide is illegal, given the con-

128. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 8.4 reporter’s notes 1, 6 (2003).
129. For a further discussion, see Hirsch, Obsolescence, supra note 15, at
620–23.
130. Only slayer statutes in Louisiana and Wisconsin allow a testator to
override the statutory bar. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 941, 943, 945 (2000); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 854.14(6) (West 2002).
131. But see Jeffrey G. Sherman, Mercy Killing and the Right to Inherit, 61
U. CIN. L. REV. 803 passim (1993) (suggesting that mercy killings be removed
from the scope of statutory bans on inheritance by slayers). Professor Sherman
argues that “because mercy killing cases clearly involve no mercenary motives,” lawmakers could carve out an exception from statutes barring inheritance by slayers without compromising deterrence. Id. at 860, 873. He offers no
evidence to support this empirical claim; yet, in some mercy killing cases,
mixed motives have been alleged. E.g., Woman Denies Manipulating Euthanased Partner, AUSTL. BROAD. CORP. NEWS, June 4, 2008, available at 2008
WLNR 10523189 (reporting an instance where the victim of an assisted suicide changed his will a week before his death, naming his slayer as primary
beneficiary). On the other hand, in those few jurisdictions that have legalized
assisted suicide, see, e.g., Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211, 1215–21 (Mont.
2009), inheritance by an assisting physician should be permissible, given the
state’s determination that the activity for which the bequest acts as an incentive is not socially harmful.
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tract’s tendency to induce illegal behavior.132 The two problems
are structurally equivalent. That lawmakers have treated them
alike attests to their capacity, at least on occasion, to maintain
structural symmetry despite categorical division and without
explicit comparative analysis.
B. CAPRICIOUS PURPOSES
Another sort of bequest that lawmakers forbid in certain
instances takes a different form. Some wills allocate funds for
the accomplishment of purposes, as opposed to the enrichment
of individual beneficiaries. Testators usually fashion these bequests as trusts, whereby trustees are charged with expending
trust funds in pursuit of testators’ objectives. If the purpose
serves the public interest the trust is deemed charitable, and
lawmakers not only give it effect but exempt it from taxation.133
Conversely, if the purpose harms the public interest the trust is
deemed against public policy, and lawmakers prohibit its creation.134
In both of these instances, by definition, the testator’s estate plan touches third parties, and these spillover effects dictate legal doctrine. Where the effect is a positive one, lawmakers encourage creation of the trust with what is technically
called a Pigouvian subsidy (in the form of tax relief), as economic theory dictates.135 Where the effect is a negative one,
lawmakers disallow the trust, lest it impose costs on others.
Yet, bequests for some purposes neither help nor harm society. In economic terms, their spillover effects are either inconsequential or negligible. As a matter of judicial doctrine,
such a trust for a noncharitable purpose is permissible but not
fully enforceable. Whereas the state attorney general has
standing to sue a charitable trustee for breach of trust, no one
has like standing to compel performance of a noncharitablepurpose trust. Alternative beneficiaries can sue only to terminate the trust when the trustee either initially or subsequently
declines to carry it out. A noncharitable-purpose trust thus
132. Supreme Commandery of the Knights of the Golden Rule v. Ainsworth, 71 Ala. 436, 447 (1882); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 572 & cmt. a &
illus. 5 (1932); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 192 (1981)
(reiterating the general principle but omitting the specific example).
133. I.R.C. §§ 501, 2055 (2010); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 (2003).
134. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 (2003).
135. For the seminal discussion, see A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF
WELFARE 192–94 (4th ed. 1932).
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takes effect as a mere power, technically (but confusingly)
known as an honorary trust.136
The leading scholar on trusts in his era, Professor Austin
Scott, claimed that allowing testators to make enforceable provisions for noncharitable purposes was contrary to public policy.137 Professor Scott failed to state the nature of his objection,
however, and no other scholar or court has ever articulated a
substantive justification for limiting bequests for noncharitable
purposes to powers. The only explanation for honorary trust
doctrine found in the cases and commentary is the absence of
an enforcement mechanism. This assertion is tautological, for
an honorary trust lacks an enforcement mechanism only because judges never created one.
Modern statutory law does so. Every state today allows benefactors to settle enforceable noncharitable-purpose trusts, either for defined purposes (preservation of a gravesite in some
states, care of a pet animal in others), or for all purposes.138
Both the Uniform Probate Code and the Uniform Trust Code
include omnibus provisions for noncharitable-purpose trusts,
enforced against the trustee by a party named in the will or
trust instrument, or appointed by the court.139
A further limitation applies to these bequests, however. If
a bequest for a noncharitable purpose, although benign, is utterly pointless—such as publication of a worthless manuscript140—or if a bequest for an otherwise valid noncharitable
purpose is too extravagantly funded—Leona Helmsley’s $12
million bequest for the care of “Trouble,” her white Maltese dog,
in 2007 affords a notorious example141—the bequest becomes
“capricious” and thereby contrary to public policy. This rule began as a qualification to the effectiveness of honorary trusts,
136. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 47 cmt. a (2003).
137. 2 AUSTIN W. SCOTT & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS
§ 124, at 246 (4th ed. 1987) (“It is submitted that it is not in accordance with
public policy that a decedent should be permitted to control the disposition of
his property to this extent.”). The current editor of Scott’s treatise, Professor
Mark Ascher, has quietly stricken this passage from the work. See 2 SCOTT ET
AL., supra note 65, § 12.11.
138. For a recent tabulation of statutory law, see Adam J. Hirsch, Delaware Unifies the Law of Charitable and Noncharitable Purpose Trusts, EST.
PLAN., Nov. 2009, at 13, 15–16.
139. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907 (amended 2008), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 239 (1998);
UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 408–409 (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 490, 493 (2006).
140. E.g., Fid. Title & Tr. Co. v. Clyde, 121 A.2d 625, 629–30 (Conn. 1956).
141. Jeffrey Toobin, Rich Bitch, NEW YORKER, Sept. 29, 2008, at 38, available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/09/29/080929fa_fact_toobin.
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set out in the Restatement of Trusts and followed in most
(though not all) of the cases.142 The Commissioners subsequently imported the qualification into the Uniform Acts, and it is
reproduced in most (though not all) of the state statutes validating full-fledged noncharitable-purpose trusts.143
Mere caprice appears a doubtful standard on which to
judge the validity of purpose-based bequests.144 Although these
can again implicate spillover costs by virtue of the moral indignation they provoke—as reflected, for instance, in the death
threats Trouble received after news reports playing up her inheritance began to circulate145—estate plans rarely draw much
publicity, and in any event the ill feelings they elicit, either
within or without the family, are purely emotional; like other
142. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 47(2) (2003). For the original assertion of the rule, see RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 124 & cmt. g (1935). For the
case law, compare Adam J. Hirsch, Bequests for Purposes: A Unified Theory,
56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 33, 71 n.140 (1999), with id. at 82 n.182. An equivalent qualification now exists on wastefully funded charitable trusts under the
Uniform Trust Code and the third Restatement of Trusts. Such a trust becomes not merely noncharitable but void as against public policy (although a
court can subject the trust to cy pres). UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 404 & cmt., 413 &
cmt. (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 484 –85, 509–10 (2006); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 8 & cmt. g & illus. 18, 67 & cmt. c(1) (2003). This qualification on charitable trusts did not, however, appear in the second Restatement of Trusts. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (1959),
with id. § 400 (contemplating cases where the charitable purpose is “fully accomplished” as opposed to wastefully funded). This qualification has also remained absent from much, but not all, of the case law. See 6 SCOTT ET AL., supra note 65, § 39.5.2, at 2726–28; Roger G. Sisson, Note, Relaxing the Dead
Hand’s Grip: Charitable Efficiency and the Doctrine of Cy Pres, 74 VA. L. REV.
635, 641–44 (1988).
143. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907(c)(6) (amended 2008), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 240
(1998); UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 404 & cmt., 409 & cmt. (amended 2005), 7C
U.L.A. 484, 493–94 (2006). The meaning of the Uniform Probate Code’s provision on point is ambiguous, however. For further analysis and legislative history, see Adam J. Hirsch, Trusts for Purposes: Policy, Ambiguity, and Anomaly in
the Uniform Laws, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 913, 918–20 (1999). Among the
states, Delaware is notable in its validation of trusts for capricious noncharitable purposes. Hirsch, supra note 138, at 17. Under the Uniform Acts (albeit
again not without ambiguity) and some non-Uniform state statutes, a court
can cut capriciously overfunded trusts down to a reasonable size—a power
that was invoked in the case of Helmsley’s trust for Trouble. Id. at 17 nn.43–
44; Toobin, supra note 141, at 41. Lawmakers could reasonably characterize
wasteful trusts for charitable purposes as noncharitable on account of their
want of social benefit, but lawmakers need not deem these trusts void as
against public policy. Cf. supra note 142.
144. For a further and fuller discussion, see Hirsch, supra note 142, at 69–84.
145. Toobin, supra note 141, at 40. Indeed, any type of “unnatural” estate
plan could trigger indignation of this sort.
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emotional responses, these should dissipate rapidly.146 At any
rate, political theorists have long disputed the legitimacy of
moral indignation as a social “harm,” especially where (as here)
few directly witness the offensive transfer.147
The drafters of the Restatement fail to state in concrete
terms the nature of their objection to trusts for capricious purposes. Their commentary on the matter is cryptic and conclusory:
Although one may deal capriciously with one’s own property, selfinterest ordinarily restrains such conduct. In any event, society may
be properly reluctant to interfere with such a use of property by its
current owner. Where, however, a former owner has attempted to [do
so,] . . . it is contrary to sound public policy.148

The distinction this annotation draws between wasteful
consumption and capricious trusts is doubtful at best. Assuming the drafters object to the capricious use of property on normative grounds, then that norm should apply equally to personal use or use through an intermediary trustee. In
consequential terms, each is equally objectionable or unobjectionable, so why should society be more “reluctant to interfere”
with the one than with the other?149 Self-interest will operate
as a natural restraint on conduct to exactly the same extent,
whether an owner spends a sum of money or hands it over to a
trustee to spend. Possibly, by a “former”150 owner, the drafters
mean to refer to a dead owner, which is our focus in any case.
In this context, self-interest is not quite equally implicated, because once they die owners no longer need to provide for themselves; the removal of this concern frees them to squander
wealth. Yet, even so, their propensity to squander is unlikely to
rise on that account. Although spared from personal expenses,
the dead still face opportunity costs. Every dollar a decedent

146. See Timothy D. Wilson et al., Making Sense: The Causes of Emotional
Evanescence, in 1 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ECONOMIC DECISIONS 209, 209–10
(Isabelle Brocas & Juan D. Carrillo eds., 2003) (reporting studies demonstrating the transience of emotional reactions).
147. For a summary of the debate and further references, see TREBILCOCK,
supra note 35, at 61–64.
148. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 47 cmt. e (2003); see also id. § 29
cmt. m. For references to judicial discussions, see Hirsch, supra note 142, at
73–74.
149. See supra text accompanying note 148. Lawmakers could regulate
wasteful consumption via the tax system if they were disposed to do so. For a
further discussion, see Hirsch, supra note 142, at 79–80.
150. See supra text accompanying note 148.
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wastes is a dollar he or she could devote to loved ones, or to
purposes that truly mattered to him or her.151
Perhaps, though, the drafters’ assertion of public policy also follows from an implicit assessment of capricious estate
planning in light of the economic aims of freedom of testation.
Lawmakers grant freedom of testation, inter alia, because it
reinforces testators’ incentives to produce and save. But
when—or to the extent—a testator cares so little about estate
planning that he or she would throw away the opportunity to
make meaningful bequests, by hypothesis, the testator’s indifference suggests that freedom of testation will have little impact on his or her economic proclivities.
If this is the policy behind the capricious purpose doctrine,
then lawmakers are again applying it inconsistently. A testator
remains free to select his or her beneficiaries carelessly. These
occasionally resemble lottery winners, showing up in wills out
of the blue—as when a testator bequeaths to a favorite entertainer,152 a favorite politician,153 a favorite student,154 a favorite
waitress,155 a favorite paperboy,156 or a litigant who had once
tried his case before the testator, sitting as a judge.157 In choosing beneficiaries, at least, a testator can make an estate plan
“as eccentric, as injudicious, or as unjust as caprice, frivolity,
[or] revenge can dictate.”158
151. Even the reclusive Leona Helmsley left the bulk of her estate to relatives and charity. Toobin, supra note 141, at 38.
152. Fan Death Wish? A Richer Bronson, CINCINNATI POST, Feb. 25, 1999,
at A22, available at 1999 WLNR 972899 (remarking bequest of an entire estate of nearly $300,000 to the screen actor, Charles Bronson).
153. Eileen Keerdoja et al., Living Well Is the Best Revenge, NEWSWEEK,
May 23, 1983, at 12 (remarking bequest of $200,000 to Senator, and one-time
presidential candidate, George McGovern).
154. Karen Houppert, A Room of Her Own, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2009, at
W44 (Magazine), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2009/10/23/AR2009102302144.html (reporting $75,000 life insurance
policy that named as beneficiary a student who had taken several classes with
the insured twenty years earlier, and who had had only occasional contact
with her since, to the bewilderment of the beneficiary).
155. Cranky Patron Leaves $50K, Car to Waitress, CINCINNATI POST, Dec.
29, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 25674180.
156. Customer Leaves $50,000 to His Former Paperboy, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, June 29, 1998, at A6, available at 1998 WLNR 6660036.
157. The testator felt he had judged the case poorly and limited the bequest
to the litigant’s court costs. DAVID PANNICK, JUDGES 2 (1987).
158. Schneider v. Vosburgh, 106 N.W. 1129, 1130 (Mich. 1906). “Heirs lawfully may be disinherited for no reason.” In re Estate of Koch, 849 P.2d 977,
992 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993).
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At any rate, we ought not be too quick to assume that capricious purposes or arbitrary distributions signal indifference
to estate planning. Seemingly wasteful bequests could find
their logic—and utility—in the statements they make, allowing
a testator to influence how he or she is remembered.159 Outsized bequests for the care of pet animals may also signify emotional attachments comparable to ones that more commonly tie
testators to human beneficiaries.160 It also bears noting that
testators must possess testamentary capacity before they can
exercise freedom of testation, and one element of capacity is the
ability to recognize the natural objects of one’s bounty.161 In
other words, testators cannot make any estate plan unless they
retain the mental wherewithal to appreciate the opportunity
costs that lend gravity to seemingly wasteful or arbitrary bequests.
Finally, and importantly for present purposes, the capricious-purpose doctrine conflicts with contracts doctrine, where
one discovers no equivalent limitation. A contracting party remains perfectly free to enter into an agreement for the purpose
of pursuing what inheritance law would brand as capricious
ends. Of course, service contracts typically are paid for and performed during life—yet they need not be. Leona Helmsley could
have negotiated an executory contract with an individual or
company to wait on Trouble paw and paw, requiring payment
and performance only upon death, in which case the service
provider would have comprised a contract creditor with a claim
against Helmsley’s estate. Such a contract would remain invulnerable to challenge by beneficiaries or heirs on grounds of capriciousness (although they could seek to negotiate an accord
with the service provider to terminate the contract).162 If indi159. For a fuller discussion, see Hirsch, supra note 142, at 75–78.
160. Helmsley “treated [her dog Trouble] like a person, and took her everywhere. She would take that dog to bed with her every night.” Toobin, supra
note 141, at 40 (quoting a business acquaintance of Helmsley) (internal quotation marks omitted).
161. Alternative beneficiaries have sometimes challenged testamentary
capacity, often successfully, when presented with capricious estate plans.
Hirsch, supra note 142, at 81 nn.179–81. An announced challenge to the
Helmsley will resulted in a pretrial settlement. Toobin, supra note 141, at 39.
For a further discussion asserting an apparent contradiction between the capricious purpose doctrine and the sound mind doctrine, see Hirsch, supra note
142, at 80–83.
162. For a recognition that a contract can play the same role as an honorary trust, without comparing their doctrinal attributes, see Ronald C. Link &
Kimberly A. Licata, Perpetuities Reform in North Carolina: The Uniform Stat-
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viduals can fashion a contract to suit their purposes, then the
law’s refusal to give effect to a bequest for the same purposes is
dubious or even, we might say, a bit capricious.
IV. COMPULSORY BEQUESTS
The antithesis of a forbidden bequest is a compulsory bequest.163 Lawmakers could require individuals to distribute
portions of their estates to particular beneficiaries. Carried to
the extreme, such mandates would function to abolish freedom
of testation. Carried less far, a legal system can combine specific compulsory bequests with residual freedom of testation. Once
again, contract law affords an analogy in the form of so-called
compulsory contracts—that is, the mandatory offers of services
at fixed tariffs that public utilities and other common carriers
have had to make to ordinary citizens.164
Obviously, compulsory bequests encroach upon a testator’s
liberty more aggressively than forbidden bequests. A testator
faced with a prohibition on a preferred estate plan can substitute the next best alternative. Compulsory bequests form a part
of the estate plan no matter how much the testator loathes the
idea. Lawmakers might again cite spillover costs to justify
compulsory bequests. To do so, however, lawmakers must have
reason to conclude that failure to make a bequest would prove
more costly to third parties—or to the state—than the cost of
the bequest itself, thereby creating inefficiency. Lawmakers
might also point to a second justification for compulsory bequests that we have not encountered up to now. Precisely because compulsory bequests impose themselves more intrusively
than forbidden ones, a welfarist or “liberal” state could wield
them to achieve objectives of distributive justice.
utory Rule Against Perpetuities, Nondonative Transfers, and Honorary Trusts,
74 N.C. L. REV. 1783, 1837 (1996); see also Hirsch, supra note 143, at 946
n.147. For cases, see, for example, French v. Kensico Cemetery, 30 N.Y.S.2d
737, 737–38 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (contracting for care of a grave); Kahlmeyer v.
Green-Wood Cemetery, 23 N.Y.S.2d 17, 20 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (same); Sarah v.
Primarily Primates, Inc., 255 S.W.3d 132, 143–46 (Tex. App. 2008) (contracting for care of animals held not to create a trust). On the doctrine of accord
and satisfaction, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 281 (1981). Bilateral monopoly problems might tend to hamper such an accord.
163. Although an oxymoron, the expression “compulsory bequest” is
adopted here in preference to the wordier, but more accurate, “compulsory uncompensated transfer upon death.”
164. Todd D. Rakoff, Is “Freedom from Contract” Necessarily a Libertarian
Freedom?, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 477, 478. In recent decades, deregulation has
done away with most compulsory contracts in the United States.
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As earlier noted, distributive considerations appear to have
inspired certain compulsory rules within contract law, a move
Dean Anthony Kronman has defended.165 Under Dean Kronman’s analysis, though, a redistributive rule of contract accords
with liberal political theory only if it meets certain conditions:
it must redistribute wealth according to some accepted criterion of fairness, it must achieve the agreed theoretical goal in
practice, and it must do so more efficiently than alternative legal avenues to the same goal, such as taxation.166 No reason
appears to assess a redistributive rule of testation according to
a different standard.
Historically, lawmakers in the United States and elsewhere have contemplated two sorts of compulsory bequests, although their functionality for purposes of achieving either efficiency or distributive justice is hardly manifest.
A. SPOUSAL SHARES
American lawmakers accord spouses inheritance rights
that have varied over time. The primary and predominant right
today is the “elective share,” also commonly known as the
“forced share,” whereby a surviving spouse can claim a specified fraction of the net probate estate, real and personal, of the
decedent spouse, as an alternative to the sum bequeathed to
the survivor under the decedent’s will. The right is set by statute and varies in its details from state to state.167
In analyzing the elective share conceptually, it is helpful to
consider that the right arises only in consequence of a couple’s
decision to embark upon a relationship that is itself often described as contractual in nature—their exchange of vows both
solemnizes and symbolizes a meeting of the minds. Couples
remain free to waive many of the terms of the “marital con-

165. See supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text.
166. Kronman, supra note 42, at 498, 507–08.
167. For an overview, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND
OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS ch. 9 (2003). Instead of the elective share, nine
states (with variations) accord immediate and reciprocal rights to both spouses
in half the property earned by each during the marriage. This system of marital property law (as opposed to inheritance law) is known as community property. Uniquely in the United States, one jurisdiction (Georgia) grants no right
of either sort to spouses (although they do receive a one-year support allowance). For a state-by-state survey, see ROBERT B. JOSLYN, SURVIVING
SPOUSE’S RIGHTS TO SHARE IN DECEASED SPOUSE’S ESTATE (2004), available
at http://www.actec.org/resources/publications/studies/Study10.pdf.
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tract,”168 rendering marital rights at least partly mutable.169 To
the extent that it determines rights of inheritance, the marital
contract is also a kind of contract to make a will.170 Accordingly,
the problems of freedom of contract and freedom of testation
come together at this juncture. If couples have freedom to forgo
the elective share as a term in the marital contract, they will
also gain greater freedom of testation.171 If they lack the first,
then they will also lose the second.
Under American law, couples do enjoy freedom to modify
inheritance rights via prenuptial agreements.172 The elective
share therefore operates as a default rule under contract law
and does not wholly confine freedom of testation.173 This need
not be so, and it is not so under British law, for example, which
168. This term has come into common use in the literature. E.g., Lloyd R.
Cohen, Marriage: The Long-Term Contract, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 10 passim (Antony W. Dnes & Robert Rowthorn eds.,
2002); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract,
84 VA. L. REV. 1225 passim (1998). For an early discussion, see Ditson v. Ditson, 4 R.I. 87, 101–02 (1856) (rejecting this characterization).
169. Although commentators observe a trend in the direction of greater
freedom to modify the marital contract, that freedom remains far from absolute—many of its terms do remain compulsory in the United States. Jill Elaine
Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 834 –42 (2004).
170. For a further discussion of this hybrid category, see Hirsch, supra note
2, at 1078–82.
171. Testators will still lack complete freedom of testation unless they can
unilaterally avoid the elective share. Although unilateral strategies for avoiding the elective share do exist under current law, they involve uncertainty, inconvenience, and expense. For discussions, see Jeffrey N. Pennell, Minimizing
the Surviving Spouse’s Elective Share, 32 INST. ON EST. PLAN. ¶ 9, at 1, 19–47
(1998); Terry L. Turnipseed, Why Shouldn’t I Be Allowed to Leave My Property
to Whomever I Choose at My Death? (Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and
Start Loving the French), 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 737, 781–87 (2006).
172. For an early example, see Naill v. Maurer, 25 Md. 532, 538–40 (1866).
Accord Stratton v. Wilson, 185 S.W. 522, 525 (Ky. 1916) (distinguishing prenuptial agreements concerning rights at death from rights upon divorce, the
first being valid and the second—at that time—invalid). For modern doctrine,
see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 9.4 (2003); Stephen R. Pitcher, Waiver of Spousal Rights in Estate of Deceased Spouse, 7 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts 443 passim (1975). A prospective
spouse who would prefer a prenuptial agreement may nevertheless hesitate to
request one, because of the signals it would send to the other party.
MARGARET F. BRINIG, FROM CONTRACT TO COVENANT: BEYOND THE LAW AND
ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY 39 (2000); Carolyn J. Frantz, Should the Rules of
Marital Property Be Normative?, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 265, 274. Even so,
these agreements have become increasingly common. Allison A. Marston,
Note, Planning for Love: The Politics of Prenuptial Agreements, 49 STAN. L.
REV. 887, 891 (1997).
173. For a recognition, see Laura A. Rosenbury, Two Ways to End a Marriage: Divorce or Death, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 1227, 1233, 1243.
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disallows couples from overriding by contract spousal inheritance rights.174
In assessing the elective share, then, we have several issues before us. Should lawmakers allow couples contractually
to avoid the elective share? Assuming so, what form (if any)
should the elective share take? And assuming not, what form
should it take? Analysis in light of the articulated rationales for
spousal-inheritance rights suggests that lawmakers have poorly coordinated the elective share in its contractual domain with
the elective share in its testamentary domain—a disconnection
that could again trace to the traditional separation of the law of
contracts from the law of wills.
One historical rationale for the elective share is that it operates “to ensure that the surviving spouse has continuing financial support after the death” of the other spouse.175 In want
of such support, the surviving spouse would have to turn to the
state as benefactor of last resort. Translated into the vernacular of economics, the absence of an elective share would produce
spillover costs.
This rationale corresponds with and justifies the prevailing
nonreciprocal structure of the elective share, which protects only the surviving spouse. Under elective-share doctrine, a decedent spouse cannot bequeath any portion of the survivor’s
property, a qualification that makes sense when the objective is
to avoid impoverishment. Decedents have no need for financial
support.
At the same time, an elective share tailored to avoid spillover costs would require a more refined calculation of the size
of the share than current law stipulates. With this end in view,
lawmakers should match the elective share with the amount
necessary to render a surviving spouse ineligible for public assistance. The Uniform Probate Code responds to this concern
174. Stewart Leech, “With All My Worldly Goods I Thee Endow”? The Status of Prenuptial Agreements in England and Wales, 34 FAM. L.Q. 193 passim
(2000).
175. Mongold v. Mayle, 452 S.E.2d 444, 447 (W. Va. 1994). As the quotation
intimates, the elective share extends in this respect spouses’ responsibilities to
provide for each other’s essential expenses while both are alive and still married, whether they are living together or separated. For a discussion of the living support obligation, see HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC
RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES §§ 7.1, 7.3–.4 (2d ed. 1987). For like commentary on the purpose of the elective share, see, for example, In re Estate of
Amundson, 621 N.W.2d 882, 886–87 (S.D. 2001); UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. 2,
pt. 2, gen. cmt. (amended 2008), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 67 (Supp. 2010).
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via rough approximation on the downside, by setting a minimum dollar amount for the elective share that supplements its
fractional amount for smaller decedents’ estates.176 The Code
nevertheless fails to take account of the absence of spillover
costs on the upside, setting no maximum amount for the elective share.177
What is more, hardly any lawmakers have addressed the
problem of spillover costs in connection with freedom to contract around the elective share. Yet, this concern has not escaped attention in other contexts. Under the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, a party can avoid a prenuptial agreement
that would cause him or her “to be eligible for support under a
program of public assistance,” in the wake of divorce.178 Inexplicably, and perhaps accidentally, the Act fails to extend this
caveat to prenuptial agreements that take effect in the wake of
death.179 Likewise, after rehearsing the support rationale for
the elective share, and after adjusting the (downside) amount
of the elective share with this rationale in mind, the drafters of
the Uniform Probate Code saw fit to allow a prenuptial agree176. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202(b) (amended 2008), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 76
(Supp. 2010). This provision “implements the support theory.” Id. § 2-202 cmt.;
see also id. art. 2, pt. 2, gen. cmt. (placing the minimum elective share amount
in the context of social security and other entitlements).
177. The Commissioners are aware that for large estates the elective share
“may go far beyond the survivor’s needs,” and that it disregards whether or
not the survivor has “ample independent means.” Id. art. 2, pt. 2, gen. cmt.
Nonetheless, the Commissioners recognized these features of the elective
share as “conventional” and included them in the Uniform Probate Code on
that basis. Id.
178. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6(b) (1983), 9C U.L.A. 35, 49
(2001) (adopted by twenty-six states). By the same token, spouses cannot
waive by prenuptial agreement the doctrines requiring them to provide for
each other’s necessary expenses while both are alive and they remain married.
Id. (covering separation); Hasday, supra note 169, at 838–40 (noting the immutability of the doctrine of necessaries, applicable to couples living together).
179. Whereas the Act covers prenuptial agreements disposing of property
“upon separation, marital dissolution, [or] death,” see UNIF. PREMARITAL
AGREEMENT ACT § 3(a)(3) (1983), 9C U.L.A. 43 (2001), the provision overriding
agreements rendering a spouse eligible for public assistance refers only to
spouses eligible for such assistance “at the time of separation or marital dissolution.” Id. § 6(b). By distinguishing death from marital dissolution, section 3
implies that under the terminology of the Act “marital dissolution” does not
include termination of a marriage on account of death. See id. § 3(a)(3). Nevertheless, the Act’s prefatory note states that the limitation contained in section
6 covers spouses rendered eligible for public assistance “at the time of separation, marital dissolution, or death.” Id. prefatory note (emphasis added). This
statement suggests that the drafters were confused about the implications of
their wording of sections 3 and 6.
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ment to waive the elective share, even to the point of destitution.180 It would appear the Commissioners contemplated freedom of contract and freedom of testation as separate and distinct problems. Only one state today bars contractual waivers
of the elective share that impose spillover costs.181
A second historical justification for the elective share requires a different analysis. Lawmakers and commentators have
often maintained that the united efforts of spouses cause them
over time to contribute either directly or indirectly to each other’s wealth. This implicit economic partnership stands beside
the explicit aspects of their partnership, entitling them both to
share in their collective wealth at death.182
The Uniform Probate Code observes the partnership rationale by varying the amount of the elective share with the dura-

180. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-213 (amended 2008), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 129–
31 (1998). The drafters of the Uniform Probate Code fail to explain this decision, stating only that the Code “incorporates the standards by which the validity of a prenuptial agreement is determined under the Uniform Premarital
Agreement Act § 6.” Id. § 2-213 cmt.
181. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-05-07 (2010) (“A surviving spouse’s waiver is not enforceable if the surviving spouse proves that . . . [it] would reduce
the assets or income available to the surviving spouse to an amount less than
those allowed for persons eligible for . . . [government] assistance . . . on the
basis of need.”).
182. E.g., In re Estate of Amundson, 621 N.W.2d 882, 887 (S.D. 2001);
Mongold v. Mayle, 452 S.E.2d 444, 447 (W. Va. 1994); UNIF. PROBATE CODE
art. 2, pt. 2, gen. cmt. (amended 2008), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 67 (Supp. 2010);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§§ 9.1 cmt. b, 9.2 reporter’s note 2 (2003). Indirect contributions typically (or
stereotypically) take the form of childcare and other household services performed by one spouse that free up the wage labor of the other spouse. For discussions, see, for example, POSNER, supra note 98, § 5.1, at 143–46; Katharine
B. Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts and the Family Economy, 93 NW. U. L. REV.
65, 92–111 (1998). The fact remains that the marital partnership theory is reductionistic, failing to take account of the variety of circumstances that could
affect the level of uncompensated contributions from one spouse to the other.
That contribution could prove greater in a joint business venture held in one
spouse’s name, see, e.g., In re Honigman’s Will, 168 N.E.2d 676, 677 (N.Y.
1960), or less if the marriage is a childless one, see Rosenbury, supra note 173,
at 1287, or greater again if one spouse provided end-of-life care for the other,
Silbaugh, supra, at 137 (“Elder care in second marriages may be the moral
equivalent of childcare in first marriages.”); see also Borelli v. Brusseau, 16
Cal. Rptr. 2d 16, 18–20 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding that a contract between
spouses under which one promised to nurse the other, who had suffered a
stroke, in exchange for a bequest under the disabled spouse’s will was not
supported by consideration, given the preexisting duty between spouses to
provide mutual support).
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tion of the marriage.183 At the same time, the restriction of the
elective share to the surviving spouse under the Uniform Probate Code, as is conventional under state law, clashes with this
rationale. Elective share doctrine gives the first spouse to die
no right to bequeath any portion of the survivor’s property, although this right should follow from the proposition that the
wealth of each derived from pooled effort.184 This structural
feature of the elective share fits only the support rationale and
seems to repudiate the partnership rationale.
At any rate, switching to the perspective of contract law,
the partnership rationale suggests no reason to curtail couples’
freedom to waive their inheritance rights in a prenuptial
agreement. As a general proposition, parties are free to give up
entitlements to property via contract. Yet, once we fashion the
elective share as a default rule in contract law, other issues
183. UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-202 & cmt., 2-203 & cmt. (amended 2008), 8
pt. 1 U.L.A. 76, 78 (Supp. 2010). In light of the variety of forms and levels of
marital contributions, see supra note 182, lawmakers could alternatively give
courts discretion to assign a forced share, as is true under British law. For
proposals to this effect, see Helene S. Shapo, “A Tale of Two Systems”: AngloAmerican Problems in the Modernization of Inheritance Legislation, 60 TENN.
L. REV. 707, 732–39, 780–81 (1993); Angela M. Vallario, Spousal Election:
Suggested Equitable Reform for the Division of Property at Death, 52 CATH. U.
L. REV. 519 passim (2003). For criticisms of this idea, see Mary Ann Glendon,
Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and Succession Law,
60 TUL. L. REV. 1165, 1185–91 (1986); John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Redesigning the Spouse’s Forced Share, 22 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J.
303, 314, 320–21 (1987). For a contracts analogy, see supra note 44 and accompanying text.
184. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202(a)(amended 2008), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 76
(Supp. 2010). In addition, a surviving spouse must live long enough to exercise
a right of election; if, hard on the death of one spouse, the surviving spouse
dies in turn, his or her personal representative cannot exercise the right in favor of his or her estate. Id. § 2-212(a) & cmt. In both of these respects, the elective share differs fundamentally from the community property system. See supra note 167. The drafters claim that the Uniform Probate Code’s redesigned
elective share suffices “to bring elective-share law into line with the contemporary view of marriage as an economic partnership,” see id. art. 2, pt. 2, gen.
cmt., but plainly the community property system accomplishes this goal more
fully. The Commissioners had considered the possibility of a right of election
exercisable by the estate of the first spouse to die, or by the estate of a surviving spouse who dies shortly after the first to die, which they recognized was
“more consistent with the marital partnership theory.” Lawrence W. Waggoner, Spousal Rights in Our Multiple-Marriage Society: The Revised Uniform
Probate Code, 26 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 683, 731 n.123 (1992). The Commissioners nevertheless rejected the idea because it “would contravene the
purpose of an elective-share system,” which “states traditionally view as
. . . personally benefitting the surviving spouse rather than the beneficiaries of
a spouse’s estate.” Id. at 738 n.146.

2228

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[95:2180

arise that most commentators on the elective share—fixated on
its testamentary aspect—have overlooked. Orthodox default
rule theory requires that the mutable terms of a contract correspond with the intent of a majority of parties, in the interest
of minimizing transaction costs.185 The question then becomes
whether most couples drafting a marital contract would prefer
that it include rights of inheritance and, assuming so, how most
would prefer to structure those rights.
That is a matter demanding empirical study, although we
can speculate about couples’ probable preferences on the basis
of logical conjecture. The best way to think about the problem is
to break down the reasons why persons sometimes prefer to
disinherit their marital partners and then inquire whether
most couples would have cause to value a forced share vel non,
despite those reasons.
One obvious explanation for spousal disinheritance is marital disharmony. In this connection, spouses might understandably wish the marital contract to include a right to recoup
wealth owned by the other spouse that they had a hand in
creating, or even a broader right to share wealth as a means of
coinsurance against want.186 Still, spouses nowadays are likely
to terminate a failed marriage prior to death, making property
rights upon divorce the key component of contractual protection.187 Given a spouse’s unilateral power to sue for divorce, in-

185. On inheritance default rules, see Hirsch, Default Rules, supra note 15.
For a rare recognition of the potential of spousal inheritance rights to minimize transaction costs, see POSNER, supra note 98, § 18.8, at 550.
186. See Rick Geddes & Paul J. Zak, The Rule of One-Third, 31 J. LEGAL
STUD. 119, 126–30 (2002) (presenting an economic model showing that an efficient division of labor within the family cannot occur unless marital partners
precommit to provide the childrearing spouse with long-term support); Linda
J. Waite, Does Marriage Matter?, 32 DEMOGRAPHY 483, 498 (1995) (remarking
the insurance attribute of marriage); supra note 182 and accompanying text.
To the extent the preference for insurance stands over and above the preference to recoup mutual contributions to wealth, the Uniform Probate Code’s
decision to tie the elective share amount to the duration of the marriage, see
supra note 183, becomes problematic.
187. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., VITAL AND HEALTH STATISTICS
COHABITATION, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND REMARRIAGE IN THE UNITED STATES
21–22 (2002), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_23/sr23_022
.pdf (“Most separated women make the transition to divorce very quickly: 84
percent . . . divorce within 3 years, and 91 percent do so within 5 years.”). Broken down along ethnic lines, the divorce rate five years after separation
among black, Hispanic, and white women is sixty-seven percent, seventyseven percent, and ninety-seven percent, respectively. Id. But cf. Langbein &
Waggoner, supra note 183, at 313 (observing that within certain religions “di-
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surance against disinheritance becomes largely superfluous.
Nevertheless, assuming that risk aversion motivates a majority
of couples to prefer this sort of insurance anyway, the restriction of the elective share to the surviving spouse would lie in
doubt. If the happenstance of survival determines whether a
spouse can claim the elective share, then his or her entitlement
is exposed to greater risk, reducing the usefulness of the elective share as a form of insurance—not insurance against privation in this context, but rather as life insurance.188 Empirical
evidence could still reveal that most spouses prefer to include
only a right to insurance against lifetime privation, and not life
insurance, in the marital contract. In that event, the current
structure of the elective share would correspond with majority
preferences. Assuming, though, that most spouses also prefer
to include in the marital contract a right to recoup their implicit contributions to the wealth of the other spouse—a right that
is not logically tied to survival, and hence which spouses should
prefer to maintain whether or not they are the first to die—
then lawmakers ought to craft an elective share that both
spouses can claim, but one that is greater for a surviving spouse
than for a decedent spouse.
Even when happily married, one spouse might prefer to
disinherit the other in order to protect the inheritance of his or
her children from prior relationships, who cannot count on benefitting in turn when the other spouse—from the children’s
perspective, a stepparent—dies. It is this scenario, in fact, that
inspires the lion’s share of prenuptial agreements today.189 Under these circumstances, risk aversion might move a spouse
who lacks independent means to welcome a forced share, especially given that in the context of a harmonious marriage divorce would comprise an unattractive option. In those instances
where both spouses have independent means, however, and
even more so where both have children from prior relationships
to protect, it is hard to imagine many spouses insisting on a
vorce is not an option”); Pennell, supra note 171, at 13–14 (noting anecdotal
examples of spouses disinherited while permanently separated).
188. By the same token, risk aversion suggests a preference for an elective
share that the executor of a surviving spouse can exercise. See supra note 184.
189. Prenuptial agreements are far more common for second marriages
than for first ones, where protection of children from prior marriages becomes
the primary consideration. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION
§ 7.05 cmt. e (2000); Marston, supra note 172, at 891; see also Randall J. Gingiss, Second Marriage Considerations for the Elderly, 45 S.D. L. REV. 469,
473–77 (2000) (noting that prenuptial agreements represent an important
element in estate planning for remarried testators).

2230

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[95:2180

forced share. Intriguingly, the elective share laws of a minority
of jurisdictions already make some allowance for this scenario:
fourteen states vary the size of the elective share depending on
whether the decedent spouse left children and, in three of those
fourteen, depending on whether the surviving spouse was also
the parent of those children.190
Ultimately, only empirical inquiry can gauge couples’
probable preferences with any degree of authority. Plausible
analysis in lieu of data suggests only that the correspondence
between spousal preferences and existing elective-share laws is
by no means assured.
Finally, two other critiques of the elective share bear noting, each of which has focused on its contractual dimension.
Professor Gail Frommer Brod submits that lawmakers ought to
curtail prenuptial agreements waiving the elective share because they “contribute to the financial vulnerability of women
as a class, and . . . magnify society’s unequal distribution of resources along gender lines.”191 Professor Brod here identifies
robust spousal inheritance rights as an instrument of distributive justice.
The persuasiveness of this argument remains questionable.
Historically, at least, American women in the aggregate have
owned less than men and thus represent “an already disadvantaged socioeconomic class.”192 Reducing this aggregate disad190. Rosenbury, supra note 173, at 1253, 1256–58 & n.133. The Uniform
Probate Code fails to refine the elective share on the basis of whether decedent
spouses leave children, or children from prior relationships. See UNIF.
PROBATE CODE §§ 2-202 to -203 (amended 2008), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 76, 78 (Supp.
2010). Nevertheless, the drafters intended that by tying the scale of the elective share to the duration of the marriage, the Code would reduce the elective
share amount for marriages occurring later in life. Id. art. 2, pt. 2, gen. cmt.
For a further discussion, see Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Uniform Probate
Code’s Elective Share: Time for a Reassessment, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1,
11–33 (2003).
191. Gail Frommer Brod, Premarital Agreements and Gender Justice, 6
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 229, 240 (1994). In prior formulations, this argument
had been confined to prenuptial agreements modifying rights to property upon
divorce. Id. at 239 n.46. For a related analysis, see Silbaugh, supra note 182,
at 122–43.
192. Brod, supra note 191, at 241–42, 294. For more recent evidence, see
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 133–36 (1999) (citing to studies); Dalton Conley & Miriam Ryvicker, The Price of Female Headship: Gender, Inheritance, and Wealth Accumulation in the United States, 13 J. INCOME
DISTRIBUTION 41 passim (2004); Lena Edlund & Wojciech Kopczuk, Women,
Wealth, and Mobility, AM. ECON. REV. 146 passim (2009); Richard W. Johnson
et al., Gender Differences in Pension Wealth and Their Impact on Late-Life Inequality, 22 ANN. REV. GERONTOLOGY & GERIATRICS 116 (2002); Wojciech
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vantage promotes gender egalitarianism, an accepted social objective, even if the imbalance is disappearing rapidly.193 And although on its face the elective share represents a genderneutral rule, traditional disparities between spouses’ ages,
coupled with different life expectancies, conspire to make wives
likelier on average to survive their husbands, thereby allowing
more women than men to exercise rights to the elective
share.194 Hence, its waivability jeopardizes the rights of more
widows than widowers.
But who gains as a result? No evidence suggests that male
testators systematically favor beneficiaries of their own gender.195 Accordingly, freedom to opt out of the elective share produces no intergenerational gender-based wealth stratification.
Even with respect to the parties themselves, the matter is far
from clear. An empirical study of Georgia wills found that
wives disinherit husbands nearly twice as often as husbands
disinherit wives.196 If this datum reflects a national pattern,
then even if fewer men than women stand in a position to claim
an elective share by virtue of surviving their spouses, more
surviving men than surviving women have cause to exercise a
right of election and thus would benefit from its existence as an
unwaivable right.
What is more, we have to consider the ex ante consequences of an unwaivable elective share. If lawmakers curtailed prenuptial agreements, some would-be spouses might
prefer not to marry, even though some of their would-be partners would rather sign away rights under enforceable prenup-

Kopczuk & Emmanuel Saez, Top Wealth Shares in the United States, 1916–
2000: Evidence from Estate Tax Returns 13–15 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10399, 2004).
193. The latest study finds a dramatic shift of income and wealth toward
American women in recent decades, which suggests today “gender role reversals in both the spousal characteristics and the economic benefits of marriage.”
RICHARD FRY & D’VERA COHN, PEW RESEARCH CTR., WOMEN, MEN, AND THE
NEW ECONOMICS OF MARRIAGE 1 (2010), available at http://pewsocialtrends
.org/files/2010/11/new-economics-of-marriage.pdf.
194. Brod, supra note 191, at 244 –45, 249; Rosenbury, supra note 173, at 1232.
195. For the most recent empirical study comparing men’s and women’s
patterns of testation, also citing to earlier studies, see Kristine S. Knaplund,
The Evolution of Women’s Rights in Inheritance, 19 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 3,
21–39 (2008).
196. Pennell, supra note 171, at 16–18. This study—which appeared after
Brod published her analysis—harvests data from nine counties featuring different socioeconomic characteristics and hence may suggest broader testamentary patterns. Id. at 8–10.
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tial agreements than remain unmarried.197 A redistributive tax
regime could avoid such distortions. Kronman’s condition that
redistributive contract rules operate more efficiently than alternatives appears unmet in this instance.198
Professor Melvin Eisenberg offers another critique of
spousal inheritance rights that again explores their contractual
element. Professor Eisenberg argues for a restrictive approach
to waivers of the elective share on the basis of paternalism.199
Citing empirical evidence that overoptimism bias disposes
prospective spouses “systematically [to] understate” the risk of
marital disharmony, and also questioning their ability to anticipate the eventual impact a prenuptial agreement will have,
given evolving “income[], . . . obligations[, and] . . . personal expectations,” Eisenberg suggests that waivers of the elective
share tend to engender subsequent regret.200 Therefore, prenuptial agreements should take effect only where “the parties
were likely to have had a mature understanding that the
agreement would apply even in the kind of marriage scenario
that actually occurred.”201
Eisenberg’s analysis presupposes the existence of marital
inheritance rights; he offers no independent justifications for
those rights. But assuming they do exist, Eisenberg’s paternalistic rationale for making inheritance rights unreceptive to contractual modification is troubling. Perhaps as concerns prenup197. Brian Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of
Premarital Agreements and How We Think About Marriage, 40 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 145, 169–70, 204, 207 (1998); Brian H. Bix, The Public and Private Ordering of Marriage, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 295, 315–17; Jill Elaine Hasday,
Intimacy and Economic Exchange, 119 HARV. L. REV. 491, 505 (2005).
198. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
199. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 217–19, 254 –58 (1995). Although Professor Eisenberg fails to make explicit that paternalism underlies the limits on freedom of
contract that he advocates, all such limits intended to preempt anticipated errors of judgment rest on a paternalistic foundation. Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1541–43 (1998).
200. Eisenberg, supra note 199, at 254. For the empirical study of overoptimism bias toward marital success cited by Eisenberg, see Lynn A. Baker &
Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above Average: Perceptions and
Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439
(1993). For a subsequent study reporting equivalent findings, see Heather
Mahar, Why Are There So Few Prenuptial Agreements? 7–10, 15–16 (Harvard
Law Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 436,
2003), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard_olin/436; see also PLOUS, supra
note 115, at 134 –35 (discussing overoptimism bias generally).
201. Eisenberg, supra note 199, at 258.
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tial agreements governing rights within a failed marriage,
where evidence shows systematic overoptimism bias to exist,
lawmakers have cause to protect adults from unrealistic predictions of marital success. But it is quite enough to do so in the
context of divorce, the usual endpoint of a failed marriage.202
By extending paternalism to instances of regretted waivers of
the elective share within harmonious marriages ending in
death, where the regret stems from faulty expectations of a
random nature, we could open the door to paternalistic intrusions on the autonomy of contracting adults in countless other
situations without any clear, limiting principle to cabin the intrusions.
In sum, the case for assigning a compulsory bequest to the
surviving spouse is convincing only as concerns the narrow
subset of estates where the absence of a bequest would burden
the welfare state with spillover costs.203 Excepting that subset,
lawmakers have no cause to deny couples the right to agree to
dispense with the elective share, and even no compelling reason
to assume that they would prefer a more expansive elective
share as a default rule. And again, we may note the failure of
most lawmakers and commentators to relate prenuptial agreements as an issue in freedom of contract to the elective share as
an issue in freedom of testation, despite the interconnection of
those issues.
B. FILIAL SHARES
In most countries, bequests to children are compulsory.204
Not so in the vast majority of American states, where parents
remain free to disinherit children, even while they are minors.205 This power comprises a true instance of American legal
exceptionalism.
202. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
203. For prior commentary that questions the wisdom of an elective share,
see Pennell, supra note 171, at 7–16, 48–52; Sheldon J. Plager, The Spouse’s
Nonbarrable Share: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 681
passim (1966); Turnipseed, supra note 171.
204. Ralph C. Brashier, Protecting the Child from Disinheritance: Must
Louisiana Stand Alone?, 57 LA. L. REV. 1, 1 & n.3 (1996) (“[P]rovisions protecting children from disinheritance are in place in most modern nations throughout the world.”); see also Where There’s a Will There’s a Row, ECONOMIST, Oct.
17, 2009, at 65 (making the same observation within Europe). For ancient law,
see THE HAMMURABI CODE §§ 150, 168–169 (Chilperic Edwards ed., 1921)
(Code of Babylonia, c. 2084 –2081 B.C.).
205. For the minority of states carving out limited exceptions from this
principle, see infra note 218.

2234

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[95:2180

We may observe initially that, although the problems of a
compulsory share for spouse and child are sometimes treated
together,206 when viewed from a contracts perspective the two
raise different policy issues. Lawmakers may, or may not, hold
a surviving spouse to the terms of a prenuptial agreement. No
comparable “prenatal” agreement ever governs the rights of
would-be children. Filial rights, then, have to do uniquely with
freedom of testation, not contract.
Some commentators posit a moral obligation on the part of
parents to bequeath portions of their estates to their children.207 The theoretical framework developed in this Article offers no insight into the merits of that proposition, at least insofar as it draws strength from noneconomic factors—natural
expectations or some sort of “birthright.” To pursue the matter
would lead us into deontology. This Article follows a different
road, and for present purposes we shall assume that no claim to
a patrimony derives simply from the fact of birth.
Granting parents leeway to vary or deny bequests to children produces economic benefits of the sort that freedom of testation ideally achieves. This leeway enables a parent to finetune bequests to children in order to enhance their individual
and collective welfare—an outcome that parents’ familiarity
with, and attachment to, their children helps to ensure.208 And
this leeway also enables parents to extract preferred behaviors
from children.209 Disinheritance has long rounded out the ar206. E.g., LEWIS M. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 20–31
(1955); Ralph C. Brashier, Disinheritance and the Modern Family, 45 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 83 passim (1994).
207. See, e.g., Deborah A. Batts, I Didn’t Ask to Be Born: The American
Law of Disinheritance and a Proposal for Change to a System of Protected Inheritance, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1197, 1222–25 (1990); Ronald Chester, Disinheritance and the American Child: An Alternative from British Columbia, 1998
UTAH L. REV. 1, 5–6. For assertions of children’s more limited moral claim to
economic support during their minority, see, for example, ANNE L. ALSTOTT,
NO EXIT: WHAT PARENTS OWE THEIR CHILDREN AND WHAT SOCIETY OWES
PARENTS 33–47 (2004); Brashier, supra note 204, at 5–6, 23. For an early discussion, see 1 JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY bk. 2,
ch. 2, § 3, at 284 –86 (New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1895) (1848) (“I cannot
admit that [a parent] owes to his children, merely because they are his children, to leave them rich . . . .”). See also Frances H. Foster, Linking Support
and Inheritance: A New Model from China, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 1199, 1207–17
(summarizing the debate over filial inheritance rights).
208. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
209. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. The core idea is centuries
old. Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 10. Legislators explicitly justified the abolition of forced heirship for children in Texas in 1856 as necessary “to restore
to parents that control over their children, which the present law has . . . com-
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senal of threats a parent can aim at a wayward child—as Paris
Hilton is now discovering.210 By the same token, a parent can
augment bequests as an encouragement to dutiful children.
Compulsory bequests to children would hinder either strategy.
Of course, the behaviors parents might seek to elicit take
many forms, but one of them now looms in importance. As Professor Joshua Tate has recently argued, rising longevity in the
United States has heightened the need for end-of-life care giving, which children may be enlisted to provide.211 New empirical evidence suggests that parents are increasingly exercising
freedom of testation to reward supportive children, although
equal treatment of children remains the norm.212 In fact, we
can carry Professor Tate’s analysis a step further. Freedom of
testation allows a testator to favor an unrelated or more distantly related caregiver over the heads of his or her children
when they fail to provide care. Doubtless such cases arise rarely, but they are hardly unheard of.213
pletely destroyed.” Joseph W. McKnight, Spanish Legitim in the United
States—Its Survival and Decline, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 75, 92 (1996) (quoting
JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE STATE OF TEXAS, 6th Legis., 59–60 (1855)).
Similarly, Virginia abolished entails in 1776 because they had “render[ed
children] independent of and disobedient to their parents.” Act of Oct. 1776,
ch. 26, in 9 THE STATUTES AT LARGE: BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS
OF VIRGINIA 226, 226 (William Waller Hening ed., 1821) (preamble). For a psychological discussion, see Gerald Schneiderman, The Will as a Vehicle of Family Dynamics, 31 CANADIAN J. PSYCHIATRY 662 passim (1986).
210. In this instance, it is Paris’s grandfather, Barron Hilton, who has cut
her out of his will. Rachel Johnson, Heir Today, Gone Tomorrow, SUNDAY
TIMES (London), Oct. 28, 2007, at 4. Ironically, Paris’s great-grandfather, Conrad Hilton, had also intended to disinherit Barron—so perhaps the tree didn’t
fall far from the apple. Together Again, ECONOMIST, Jan. 7, 2006, at 58.
211. Joshua C. Tate, Caregiving and the Case for Testamentary Freedom,
42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 129, 170–76 (2008).
212. Id. at 176–81 (citing to studies). For a recent example of an uneven
estate plan explicitly prompted by caregiving, see In re Estate of Singer, 920
N.E.2d 943, 944 (N.Y. 2009). For several earlier examples, see MARVIN B.
SUSSMAN ET AL., THE FAMILY AND INHERITANCE 98–100 (1970). For additional
studies, see Jere R. Behrman & Mark R. Rosenzweig, Parental Allocations to
Children: New Evidence on Bequest Differences Among Siblings, 86 REV.
ECON. & STAT. 637 passim (2004); Hirsch, Default Rules, supra note 15, at
1086 n.247 (citing to studies); Norton & Van Houtven, supra note 7, at 158–71
(citing to earlier studies).
213. Thus, the late actress and film star Lana Turner, who died in 1995,
left part of her estate to her daughter—with whom she remained on good
terms—but she left more to her maid, in whose arms she died. Peter Sheridan,
Blondes Who Had More Fun, DAILY EXPRESS (U.K.), Sept. 27, 2008, available
at 2008 WLNR 18725605; Liz Smith, Not the Marrying Kind, NEWSDAY, Feb.
7, 2000, at A11, available at 2000 WLNR 608013; see also Ian MacKinnon,
Maid Cleans Up with £2.6m Inheritance, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), July 22,
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It remains instructive to compare this analysis with its
analogue in the realm of spousal rights. Commentators cite
each spouse’s economic contribution to the other, including eldercare, as a ground for the elective share and hence for denial
of freedom of testation.214 On reflection, the problem appears
double edged. Testamentary liberty allows one either to reward
or to slight individual service. The alternative of compulsory
bequests allows one to do neither. Still, we have reason to distinguish compulsory bequests to spouses and children in this
respect. Residing together in the family home, marital partners
share as a matter of course. Typically residing outside a parent’s home, adult children provide eldercare less uniformly;
recognition of their services requires testamentary flexibility.215
Notwithstanding this analysis, one potential justification
for compulsory bequests to children is spillover costs, which
could arise with regard to minor or disabled children who are
unable to fend for themselves. The alternative to parental support then becomes public support. As a matter of law, all jurisdictions impose on living parents the burden of providing for
their minor children under most circumstances, and in some
jurisdictions this legal duty can extend to adult disabled children as well.216 Efficiency dictates that the burden likewise fall
on parents’ estates, at least to the extent necessary to prevent
children from becoming public charges—a policy that lawmak2010, available at 2010 WLNR 14574348; Jeffrey P. Rosenfeld, Benevolent Disinheritance: The Kindest Cut, PSYCHOL. TODAY, May 1980, at 48, 51; case cited
infra note 215.
214. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
215. If children or other close relatives want to ensure that they receive
compensation for their efforts, they can insist that the testator agree to a will
contract guaranteeing their bequest. See, e.g., Kelsey v. Pewthers, 685 So. 2d
953, 954 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (where the testator turned to a nephew for
eldercare after her relationship with her child had deteriorated). A will contract can serve a function equivalent to the elective share in this connection.
Under a new and unique law in China, children must visit regularly and attend to aged parents; parents can sue a child who ignores them. Editorial,
Filial Piety as Law, CHINA DAILY (Beijing), Jan. 8, 2011, at 5, available at
2011 WLNR 418006; Xu Xiaomin, Meet the Parents, or Pay the Price, CHINA
DAILY (Beijing), Jan. 12, 2011, at 8, available at 2011 WLNR 617781. Under
such a legal regime, compulsory bequests for children can find justification as
compensatory transfers.
216. CLARK, supra note 175, § 7.2; M.C. Dransfield, Annotation, Parent’s
Obligation to Support Adult Child, 1 A.L.R.2d 910 passim (1948); Noralyn O.
Harlow, Annotation, Postmajority Disability as Reviving Parental Duty to
Support Child, 48 A.L.R.4th 919 passim (1986); Joel E. Smith, Annotation,
Parent’s Obligation to Support Unmarried Minor Child Who Refuses to Live
with Parent, 98 A.L.R.3d 334 passim (1980).
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ers have also applied in varying degrees to dependent spouses,
as earlier remarked.217 In fact, statutes in a number of states
do oblige parents to bequeath enough to a child for whom they
are legally responsible to protect the child from penury, although most of the statutes operate only in limited situations.218
Beyond efficiency, we could question whether compulsory
bequests for children would advance the ends of distributive
justice in a liberal state. If anything, the opposite is true. Modern empirical evidence shows no sign of gender discrimination
against children by either fathers or mothers that calls for amelioration.219 More broadly, compulsory bequests for children
would serve only to reinforce existing inequalities of family
wealth, passed down from generation to generation. Lawmakers mitigate those inequalities both by taxing estates and by
enabling testators to disinherit their offspring—especially if
217. See supra notes 175–81 and accompanying text.
218. Under the common law, the parental obligation to support a child
ends at the death of the parent. E.g., McKamey v. Watkins, 273 N.E.2d 542,
542 (Ind. 1971). Nevertheless, in four states a decedent parent’s estate must
provide for any child who would otherwise become a public charge if the parent while alive was obliged to support the child. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3952 (West
2004 & Supp. 2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-213 (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14 -09-12 (2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-7-14 (2009). In two additional
states, the amount of support a court can order from the decedent parent’s estate is not limited by the threshold for welfare eligibility. LA. CIV. CODE ANN.
arts. 1493–1495 (2000 & Supp. 2011) (entitling children aged twenty-three or
younger and incapacitated children to a designated fraction of the estate);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125B.130 (LexisNexis 2010) (giving the court discretion to set the amount). Under the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, support
decrees attendant to divorce or separation continue to bind the estate of a parent obligated to support the child. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 316(c)
(amended 1973), 9A pt. 2 U.L.A. 102 (1998). Seven out of the eight states that
adopted the Act include this provision. See id. at 103. For additional judicial
decisions, see Susan L. Thomas, Annotation, Death of Obligor Parent as Affecting Decree for Support of Child, 14 A.L.R.5th 557 passim (1993). Under nonUniform legislation in one other state, support orders stemming from filiation
proceedings continue to bind the decedent parent’s estate, see IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 7-1107 (2010), while another state applies the same principle to child
support orders of all sorts, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-11-51 (2010). See Benson ex rel.
Patterson v. Patterson, 782 A.2d 553, 556–57 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (questioning in dicta the constitutionality under the Equal Protection Clause of testamentary protection for children following divorce, but not for children within
“intact families”).
219. CAROLE SHAMMAS ET AL., INHERITANCE IN AMERICA 202–03 (1987);
Mary Louise Fellows et al., Public Attitudes About Property Distribution at
Death and Intestate Succession Laws in the United States, 1978 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 319, 368–70; Knaplund, supra note 195, at 21–39. For historical patterns, see SHAMMAS ET AL., supra, at 42–47, 55–57, 108–12.
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they prefer to bequeath to charity (as some of America’s wealthiest do).220
In short, economic analysis vindicates Americans’ existing,
albeit distinctive, liberty to disinherit children, apart from
those who lie on the doorstep of the welfare state. Although not
dependent on broader amalgamation with freedom of contract
for conceptual support, this deduction echoes verdicts reached
in other parts of this Article that are. The overall judgment remains that freedom of testation merits confinement only in extraordinary circumstances.
V. FUTURE INTERESTS
Some testators execute wills dictating the distribution of
property not only immediately, but on into the future. In two
ways, lawmakers restrict such “dead-hand” control. The rule
against perpetuities limits the duration of testamentary directives.221 This rule has eroded of late as applied to future interests held in trust.222 Other rules, also concerning future interests held in trust, allow a court to modify trust terms in light of
changing circumstances. These rules have gained strength of
late.223 Is either sort of limitation defensible?

220. See infra note 285.
221. Strictly speaking, the rule against perpetuities confines contingent
interests and is just one of three operative doctrines regulating the longevity
of future interests. A second doctrine confines the duration of honorary trusts
and a third one confines accumulations. Hirsch, supra note 143, at 930–50;
Robert H. Sitkoff, The Lurking Rule Against Accumulations of Income, 100
NW. U. L. REV. 501 passim (2006).
222. By statute, some twenty-eight states have now curtailed the rule
against perpetuities, either by permitting perpetual trusts (nineteen states) or
long-lasting trusts (nine states, with durational limits ranging between 150
and 1000 years). In three states (Arizona, Kentucky, and Pennsylvania), the
statutes curtailing the rule also allow perpetual future interests out of trust.
Many of the relevant statutes are noted in 2 SCOTT ET AL., supra note 65,
§ 9.3.9, at 498–506; for the most recently enacted statute, see KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 381.224 (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2010) (effective July 15, 2010). This
legislative trend at the state level is being driven by competitive pressure to
attract trust business from testators minded to avoid generation-skipping
transfer taxes at the federal level. Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The
Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1303, 1311–16 (2003); Max M.
Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Perpetuities or Taxes? Explaining the Rise
of the Perpetual Trust, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2465 passim (2006). For a recent
discussion and criticism of the trend, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS ch. 27, intro. note, at 122–29 (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2010) (approved May 2010).
223. See infra notes 233–39 and accompanying text.
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The problem of temporal boundaries on future interests is
a large subject that defies easy summary. A collaborator and I
have addressed the problem in economic terms at greater
length elsewhere.224 To put the matter briefly: several of the
traditional justifications for freedom of testation lose their force
as the testator extends his or her grip over property into the future. Testators cannot trade bequests for services performed by
a circle of relatives who remain unborn. By the time they come
into being, those relatives stand in no position to reciprocate.225
Nor does the notion that freedom of testation results in better
estate planning226 hold up when a testator ventures to create
future interests. When providing for existing family members,
a testator brings to the estate-planning process a depth of
knowledge gleaned from a lifetime of interaction with them.
But the same temporal horizon that obstructs tacit bargains
between a testator and future generations clouds his or her
ability to see—and hence to see to—their needs. Estate planning for future generations is better delayed until those needs
materialize.
At the same time, a third traditional justification for freedom of testation—namely, that it spurs testators to produce
and save227—continues to apply to future interests. The longer
freedom of testation persists, the greater testators’ incentives
to accumulate wealth.228 But further extensions of this freedom
224. Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5. For another recent exploration of the
subject, see Eric Rakowski, The Future Reach of the Disembodied Will, 4 POL.,
PHIL. & ECON. 91 passim (2005).
225. BOULDING, supra note 5, at 97 (“Making sacrifices for a distant posterity is clearly the purest form of [gratuity] that can be imagined, for there can
be no vestige of exchange in it.”). On bequests to living persons as a form of
quasi-exchange, see supra notes 26–28 and accompanying text.
226. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 22–25 and accompanying text.
228. Tax incentives aside, a testator’s appetite for extending dead-hand
control may be psychological in nature. Lord Kames observed long ago:
The man who has amassed great wealth, cannnot [sic] think of quitting his hold, and yet, alas! [H]e must die and leave the enjoyment to
others. To colour a dismal prospect, he makes a deed . . . securing his
estate . . . to those who represent him, in an endless train of succession. His estate and his heirs must for ever bear his name; [the] very
thing to perpetuate his memory and his wealth.
HENRY HOME (LORD KAMES), HISTORICAL LAW-TRACTS 142 (A. Kincaid ed., 2d
ed. 1761) (photo. reprint 2000). Similarly, Lord Hobhouse opined that deadhand control “is commonly exercised to its fullest extent, merely because it exists, and without the slightest reason beyond the pleasure of exercising power.” ARTHUR HOBHOUSE, THE DEAD HAND 183 (Chatto & Windus 1880). For a
modern psychological explanation of the craving for “symbolic immortality,”
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should yield diminishing marginal utility, given the testator’s
attenuated connection with the unborn, coupled with the universal tendency to discount future benefits.229
Meanwhile, extended dead-hand control can also entail inefficiency, although the matter will vary depending on the form
of control that the testator exerts. As earlier discussed,230 costly
conditions attached to present bequests cause no loss of efficiency, because the beneficiary can always choose to forfeit the
bequest if its cost exceeds its benefit. But if a testator elects to
restrict the use of property into the future, or attaches a condition that continues to apply to each succeeding owner of an interest in property, then later owners have no way to rid the interest of the restriction. Its costs will mount as they are borne
again and again, and perhaps also mount by virtue of changing
times. At some point, the marginal benefit to the testator of
continued control must equal the marginal cost of the restriction. Theoretically, that is the efficient boundary on dead-hand
control, and the trend lines suggest that it must exist somewhere.
The case for confining the dead hand is less easy when the
testator merely allocates ownership of property over time. Its
efficient use is then unaffected, although the testator’s decisions necessarily become arbitrary beyond the horizon of his or
her vision. That is not strictly an economic concern, although
arbitrariness remains a welfarist concern.231 There appears litsee Jamie Arndt et al., Terror Management and Self-Awareness: Evidence that
Mortality Salience Provokes Avoidance of the Self-Focused State, 24
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1216, 1217 (1998).
229. Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 21. For an early recognition, see 1
MILL, supra note 207, bk. 2, ch. 2, § 4, at 287–88.
230. See supra text following note 73.
231. For a further discussion, see Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 34 –38.
By limiting future interests to lives the testator has known (the “measuring
lives” of the rule against perpetuities, which must be lives in being when the
interest is created, although anomalously they may include lives “extraneous”
to the interest), the rule seeks to ensure that allocations are informed by testators’ insights into their beneficiaries. Adam Smith considered this the ideal
cut-off: “The best rule seems to be that we should permit the dying person to
dispose of his goods as far as he sees, that is, to settle how it shall be divided
amongst those who are alive at the same time with him.” ADAM SMITH,
LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 70 (R.L. Meek et al. eds., 1978) (ms. 1762–
1766). Lord Hobhouse agreed:
A clear obvious natural line is drawn for us between those persons
and events which the Settlor knows and sees, and those which he
cannot know or see. Within the former province we may trust his
natural affections and his capacity of judgment to make better dispositions than any external Law is likely to make for him. Within the
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tle reason to confine the dead hand, however, when the testator
fails even to dictate allocations, but instead creates a discretionary trust, whose allocations remain flexibly in the hands of a
living trustee. In that event, the dead hand applies its lightest
touch, resulting in neither inefficient use nor arbitrary allocation of property over time.232
The second means whereby lawmakers restrain the dead
hand is by granting courts power to modify estate plans over
time. Historically, judicial powers of trust modification were
narrowly confined. Under the cy pres doctrine, courts could
modify only charitable trusts, and then only if the original
terms of the trust became impossible or impractical (not merely
inconvenient) to implement, only if the estate plan suggested
that the testator would prefer modification to termination of
the trust on the ground of impossibility, and only by substituting terms as near as possible to the original ones.233
Lawmakers have progressively relaxed these restrictions,
thereby enhancing judicial power over future interests. The
rule that the trust purpose as modified must stray from the
original purpose as little as possible appeared in the first Restatement of Trusts but was watered down in the second.234
The third Restatement and the Uniform Trust Code also widen
the range of circumstances potentially triggering invocation of
the cy pres doctrine to include impossibility, impracticality, and
wastefulness.235 In addition, the Uniform Trust Code (but not
the Restatement) makes invocation of the doctrine mandatory
more than twenty-one years after a charitable trust’s creation,
even if the testator expressed an intent that the trust terminate when its original purpose becomes impossible to carry
latter, natural affection does not extend, and the wisest judgment is
constantly baffled by the course of events.
HOBHOUSE, supra note 228, at 188. For an argument that the range of a testator’s vision differs with regard to trusts for charitable and noncharitable purposes, as opposed to trusts for the benefit of individuals, see Hirsch, supra
note 142, at 84 –91.
232. For a fuller discussion, see Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 38–49.
233. For the state of the doctrine circa 1935, see RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS
§ 399 & cmts. (1935).
234. Compare RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 399 cmt. c (1935), with
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 cmts. b, d (1959). See also UNIF.
TRUST CODE § 413(a)(3) (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 509 (2006) (following the
second Restatement); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 cmt. d (2003)
(same).
235. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 413(a) (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 509 (2006);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (2003); see also supra notes 142–43.
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out.236 Finally, and most revolutionary of all, both the Uniform
Trust Code and the third Restatement create a power to modify
the substantive terms of all trusts, not just charitable ones,
where modification will “further the purposes of the trust,” in
light of “circumstances not anticipated by the settlor,” and in
line with his or her “probable intention.”237 Despite the last
stricture, the Uniform Trust Code declares this new doctrine a
mandatory rule.238 The third Restatement goes a step farther,
allowing a court to override the substantive terms of any trust
when all the beneficiaries agree, even if circumstances remain
unchanged, if the court “determines that the reason(s) for
. . . modification outweigh the material purpose” of the trust.239
What, then, of this second, emerging restraint on the freedom to dictate future interests, pertaining to their inflexibility,
as opposed to their duration—is it, too, defensible? Scholars
have, in fact, connected the two issues, linking the rise of trust
modification powers to the simultaneous decline of durational
limits on future interests. Professor David English, reporter for
the Uniform Trust Code, remarks that “the increasing use in
recent years of long-term trusts” has created “a need for greater
236. Compare UNIF. TRUST CODE § 413(b) (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 509
(2006), with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (2003). Both the Code and
the Restatement create a presumption in favor of intent to apply cy pres, in
any event. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 413(b) cmt. (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 509–10
(2006); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 cmt. b (2003).
237. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412(a) (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 507 (2006).
The Restatement contains equivalent language. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 66(1) & cmt. a (2003). For non-Uniform legislation, see 5 SCOTT ET
AL., supra note 65, § 33.4, at 2182–86. The antecedent rule of equitable deviation was limited to a power to modify the administrative terms of a trust. 2A
SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 137, § 167, at 270. In light of this provision,
which also applies to charitable trusts, Professor Ronald Chester questions
whether the Code’s cy pres provision has any continuing, independent relevance, apart from its mandatory operation after twenty-one years. Ronald
Chester, Modification and Termination of Trusts in the 21st Century: The Uniform Trust Code Leads a Quiet Revolution, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 697,
701–03, 707–09 (2001); see also RONALD CHESTER, FROM HERE TO ETERNITY?
PROPERTY AND THE DEAD HAND 47–50, 60–63 (2007). Arguably, though, the
Code’s version of equitable deviation, which allows substantive modification to
“further” trust purposes, operates more narrowly than cy pres, which allows
modification of the purpose itself. Compare UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412(a)
(amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 507 (2006), with id. § 413(a).
238. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b)(4) (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 428 (2006).
239. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65 & cmts. a, d (2003). By contrast, under the analogous provision in the Uniform Trust Code allowing the
court to modify a trust with the consent of all beneficiaries, the court cannot
disregard a “material purpose of the trust.” UNIF. TRUST CODE § 411(b)
(amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 498 (2006).
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flexibility in the restrictive rules that apply concerning when a
trust may be . . . modified.”240
Well, yes and no. To the modest extent it addresses the duration of future interests, the Uniform Trust Code does not itself empower a testator radically to prolong them, as statutes
in some states have done.241 Those states are competing for
trust business,242 and if legislators feel pressure to enhance testamentary power with respect to the duration of dead-hand
control, then as a practical matter they may shy away from
other restrictions on the dead hand that might make their jurisdiction comparatively less attractive as a trust situs.243
At the same time, as a policy matter, judicial power to
modify future interests eases their prolongation, because then
they will bend with, not stubbornly defy, evolving facts. In this
sense, a power of modification can substitute for limits on duration.244 Still, we make up for extensions of those limits by adding powers of modification that operate beyond the point where
the old limits stood. To install powers of modification that take
effect immediately when an interest commences is to curtail
temporal freedom of testation. We may discover reasons for
such a retrenchment, but they do not lie in the newfangled
power to create far-future interests.
In pursuit of those reasons, we may again find the contracts analogy instructive. Recall Judge Richard Posner’s cri240. David M. English, The Uniform Trust Code (2000): Significant Provisions and Policy Issues, 67 MO. L. REV. 143, 169 (2002). For like observations,
see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS ch. 13, introductory note (2003);
CHESTER, supra note 237, at 56; LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, DEAD HANDS: A
SOCIAL HISTORY OF WILLS, TRUSTS, AND INHERITANCE LAW 121–22 (2009); 5
SCOTT ET AL., supra note 65, § 33.6, at 2200–21.
241. The Uniform Trust Code only addresses the duration of noncharitablepurpose trusts, not trusts for individual beneficiaries. As for noncharitablepurpose trusts, the Code establishes limits on their duration that eleven states
(including Delaware) have extended. Hirsch, supra note 138, at 16, 18 & n.55.
Nor does the more general Uniform Act applicable to future interests fundamentally widen the reach of the dead hand. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. II,
pt. 9, subpt. 1, gen. cmt., § 2-901 (amended 2008), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 223, 226
(1998) (suggesting that the Uniform Act serves to simplify the law rather than
to modify the dead hand’s “traditional boundaries”).
242. See supra note 222. The competition is occurring within the context of
manifold trust doctrines, not merely the law of future interests, and Delaware
is leading the way. Hirsch, supra note 138, at 13–14.
243. It comes as no surprise that Delaware has adopted neither the Uniform Trust Code nor a mandatory rule of trust modification. See DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3303, 3541(b) (2007).
244. Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 222, at 1327–31, 1339–41; Hirsch &
Wang, supra note 5, at 50–51.
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tique of marital conditions, quoted earlier in Part II.245 His rationale for overriding them is that beneficiaries lack the opportunity to remonstrate with the late testator, to convince him or
her to waive the condition—“recontracting” is Judge Posner’s
phrase—as time goes by.246 To put the analogy more technically: if events dictate, parties can modify a contract by mutual
consent.247 But in respect of testamentary marital conditions,
modification by consent becomes impossible once death has removed one party from the negotiating table.
Professor John Langbein broadens this analysis to future
interests generally, where it becomes “the anti-dead-hand principle.”248 This principle “is fundamentally a change-ofcircumstances doctrine . . . . The living donor can always
change his or her mind, as he or she observes the consequences
of an unwise course of conduct, or as other circumstances
change, but the . . . deceased . . . cannot.”249 The third Restatement of Trusts reiterates: “the ‘rigor mortis’ of deadhand control is not present while a property owner is able to respond to
persuasion and evolving circumstances.”250
This argument holds a visceral appeal, but we must be
careful to note its limits as a rationale for trammeling freedom
of testation. The Restatement cites the rationale to justify the
immediate invalidation of marital conditions within testamen245. See supra text accompanying notes 98–99.
246. POSNER, supra note 98, § 18.7, at 548.
247. PERILLO, supra note 14, § 5.14.
248. John H. Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 NW. U.
L. REV. 1105, 1110 (2004).
249. Id. at 1111. And again: “One justification for reduced deference to the
deceased transferor is that once in the grave, a decedent cannot reconsider a
foolish course of conduct as its consequences emerge, or as circumstances
change.” John H. Langbein, Burn the Rembrandt? Trust Law’s Limits on the
Settlor’s Power to Direct Investments, 90 B.U. L. REV. 375, 378 (2010).
250. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. i (2003). The second Restatement of Property had likewise observed: “Because of an inability to consider changed circumstances, the law is less receptive to restraints imposed by
the dead hand than to those imposed by the living.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.1 cmt. c (1983). For additional scholarly
commentary in support of this rationale, see Chester, supra note 237, at 728
(“[F]lexibility . . . would appeal to many dead settlers if they could be brought
back to life.”); Mary Louise Fellows, In Search of Donative Intent, 73 IOWA L.
REV. 611, 652–55 (1988). But cf. Gregory S. Alexander, The Dead Hand and the
Law of Trusts in the Nineteenth Century, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1261–62 (1985)
(suggesting that judicial powers to modify future interests would be subject to
abuse); Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 222, at 1331, 1340–41 (observing the
uncertainty of, and the costliness to beneficiaries of, invoking a power of modification); supra note 183 (citing to peripherally relevant commentary).
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tary trusts.251 Posner himself would intervene more frugally.
He advocates only subsequent modification of marital conditions.252 But under the Restatement, the mere fact that circumstances might change without the testator being able to respond suffices to justify the condition’s nullification a priori—
even if circumstances never change, and the beneficiary simply
prefers not to fulfill the condition. In this sense, the anti-deadhand principle as reflected in the Restatement is not solely “a
change-of-circumstances doctrine.”253
If the argument for this variant of the anti-dead-hand
principle is the testator’s inaccessibility not merely to subsequent but also to immediate persuasion and reconsideration of
the condition upon his or her death, the rationale would prove
too much. On this basis, we could justify amending any estate
plan that the testator declined to divulge to beneficiaries during his or her lifetime. Once again, those beneficiaries will have
had no opportunity to state their case for redividing the estate,
and after the will comes to light in probate the testator can no
longer “change his or her mind.”254 Such a doctrine would destroy all but a remnant of freedom of testation, which no one is
advocating.
The only alternative is to abandon the anti-dead-hand
principle as a rationale for the immediate invalidation of conditions and fall back on the substantive public policy of the conditions themselves for that purpose. The third Restatement of
Trusts takes that analytical tack as well, as we have seen.255
We took pains to address this aspect of the problem earlier in
this Article.256
At the same time, the anti-dead-hand principle gains plausibility as a rationale for ex post modification of conditions and
future interests as events unfold. Considering the problem in
connection with marital conditions, Posner raises the possibility that “[a]s the deadline [for meeting the condition] approached, the [beneficiary] might come to the [testator] and
persuade him that a diligent search had revealed no marriage251. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmts. i, j (2003); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.1 cmt. c (1983).
252. See POSNER, supra note 98, § 18.7, at 548 (“This argues for applying
the cy pres approach in private as well as charitable trust cases.”). On the cy
pres doctrine, see supra text accompanying note 233.
253. See supra text accompanying note 249.
254. See supra text accompanying note 249.
255. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 73–87 and accompanying text.
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able . . . girl [of the required faith] who would accept him. The
father might be persuaded to . . . relax the condition”—a social
process foreclosed by the testator’s demise.257 In other words,
we can conceptualize the anti-dead-hand principle as an intenteffectuating doctrine, carrying out revisions the court concludes
a testator would have acceded to if only he or she were present
to exercise his or her judgment.
But here we arrive at the crux of the matter. The Uniform
Trust Code styles its doctrine of trust modification as a mandatory rule.258 That formulation is inconsistent with the rationale
that modifications are premised on a hypothetical change of
heart.259 Yet, the issue is not quite so simple as that, for,
though it purports to be mandatory, the Code’s doctrine of modification only covers “circumstances not anticipated by the settlor.”260 If the trust expressly dictates that its terms should remain unchanged even in the event that stated contingencies
occur, then those circumstances have been anticipated, and the
doctrine fails to apply.261 But then when, if ever, is the doctrine
mandatory? Only, it appears, when the trust expresses a general prohibition on modification without anticipating specific
contingencies.262
257. POSNER, supra note 98, § 18.7, at 528; see also id. § 18.3, at 544 –45.
258. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b)(4) (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 428 (2006).
259. Professor Langbein remarks the duality without criticism:
In one dimension, these change-of-circumstance rules are intentserving. They are imputed-intent doctrines, which empower the court
to modify the trust as the settlor would have wished had the settlor
known of the changed circumstance. The dimension that requires
these doctrines to be grouped with intent-defeating mandatory rules
is that the settlor is forbidden to oust them.
Langbein, supra note 248, at 1117. By comparison, the analogous rule elaborated in the third Restatement of Trusts is not expressed as a mandatory doctrine, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66 cmts. a–b (2003), although
the Restatement proposes an additional rule not found in the Uniform Trust
Code allowing the court to override a condition or restriction in the absence of
changed circumstances. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
260. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412(a) (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 507 (2006). “To
the extent practicable, the modification must be made in accordance with the
[testator’s] probable intention.” Id.
261. Thus, a testator “concerned about the possibility of an unwanted section 412(a) modification . . . could attempt to avoid one by including in the
terms of the trust a recitation of circumstances the settlor anticipated.” Alan
Newman, The Intention of the Settlor Under the Uniform Trust Code: Whose
Property Is It, Anyway?, 38 AKRON L. REV. 649, 665–66 (2005).
262. If changing circumstances transform a trust condition or restriction
into one that contravenes public policy, then the court would again ignore a
testamentary directive not to amend the trust. Langbein, supra note 248, at
1118–19.
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What could justify this sort of doctrinal distinction between
the general and the specific? The Uniform Trust Code itself offers no explanation, nor have commentators.263 Perhaps the
drafters of the Code assume a testator is less resolute when expressing a general prohibition on modification. He or she may
nevertheless have only certain eventualities in mind and would
have been more amenable to changing his or her mind about
not changing his or her mind if an unforeseen eventuality materializes. This argument suggests the possibility of a rule barring general prohibitions of modification operating beyond the
near term, excepting from the scope of the bar expressions of
intent regarding the foreseeable future. As it happens, that is
how the Code’s closely related rule of cy pres is structured to
operate.264
Still, the issue has another side to it, as the contracts analogy reveals. Just as a testator might overlook a risk when setting the terms of a future interest, so might contracting parties
fail to take into account some improbable occurrence, rendering
the contract economically irrational and “impractical” to perform. Under the doctrine of supervening frustration, echoing
the modern doctrine of trust modification, a court can rewrite
the terms of the contract.265 But the doctrine again relies on the
inference, which the court must draw, that had the parties anticipated the risk they would have worded the contract differently.266 Under the doctrine of assumption of risk, parties nevertheless can bargain around frustration by explicitly, or even
implicitly, overriding it under the terms of the contract.267 In
this respect, “relief for impracticability or hardship does not interfere with freedom of contract.”268
If the same rationale underlies the doctrine of trust modification, then the same conclusion follows. Insofar as a testator
wishes—and lawmakers could require an express statement of
intent—to assume the risk that circumstances will change in
263. See UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 105 cmt., 412 cmt. (amended 2005), 7C
U.L.A. 428, 507–08 (2006).
264. Under the Code, application of the cy pres doctrine becomes mandatory only after twenty-one years have passed. Id. § 413(b)(2).
265. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 272 cmt. c (1981).
266. Id. (“Since it is the rationale of this [rule] that, in a case of impracticability or frustration, the contract does not cover the case that has arisen, the
court’s function . . . [is that of ] supplying a term to deal with that omitted
case.”).
267. Id. §§ 261 cmt. c, 265; PERILLO, supra note 14, §§ 13.2, 13.16.
268. PERILLO, supra note 14, § 13.20, at 478.
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ways that he or she cannot foresee, then the testator should
have the same freedom to do so that a contracting party enjoys.269 To do otherwise would defeat the testator’s considered
intransigence,270 while exposing the intent-effectuating rationale for modification as a fiction.271
But even when a testator’s will is silent on the matter of
modification, if our basis for it is the hypothesis that the testator might have had a change of heart, then we still must ask—
again by analogy to the doctrine of supervening frustration—
how likely such a change of heart would be. Under contracts
doctrine, by comparison, assumption of particular risks may be
implicit.272 Our answer hinges on the testator’s motive for saddling a bequest with future conditions, or future use restrictions, or future distributive provisions. When moved by simple
benevolence, a testator ought to incline toward a more plastic
estate plan. Under conditions of interdependent utility “your
gain is my gain,” so any revision that enhances beneficiaries’
eventual happiness should prospectively enhance the testator’s.
Still, other considerations can inform future interests, and the
manner in which a testator frames them can signal, or at least
hint at, his or her willingness to alter their stipulations.
Consider conduct and use restrictions of a moral or religious nature. These a testator may impose for selfish reasons,
to express his or her own identity.273 Assuming so, we have
269. Posner raises this possibility but hedges. He advocates taking “the cy
pres approach in private . . . trust cases unless, perhaps, the testator expressly
rejects a power of judicial modification.” POSNER, supra note 98, § 18.7, at 548
(emphasis added).
270. The danger remains that an assumption-of-risk clause could become
boilerplate language in prolonged trusts and hence escape due consideration
after all. That appears unlikely, however: estate planners are sensitive to the
hazard of changed circumstances and routinely counsel clients to build flexibility into prolonged trusts. E.g., Harrison Gardner, Designing Wills and Trust
Instruments to Provide Maximum Flexibility, 18 EST. PLAN. 138 passim (1991).
By the same token, estate planners would likely counsel against assumptionof-risk clauses. Fellows, supra note 250, at 655. The appearance in a will of
such a clause “would suggest that a fairly sophisticated drafter had considered
carefully the issue of flexibility in the dispository scheme.” Id.
271. See Paul G. Haskell, Justifying the Principle of Distributive Deviation
in the Law of Trusts, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 267, 283–85, 291–92 (1967) (rejecting
the intent-effectuating rationale on this basis but nonetheless defending a mandatory power of judicial modification on the grounds that it “place[s] another
reasonable limit upon the dispositive power” of testators, in the interest of “protecting individuals to whom the testator was responsible or felt responsible”).
272. See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
273. For a discussion of this element in the social psychology of testation,
along with scholarly references, see Hirsch, supra note 142, at 52–56. In a re-
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every reason to anticipate the testator’s fixity of intent. Alternatively, a testator might insist on these restrictions out of paternalistic regard for beneficiaries, intending to inculcate in
them values or beliefs that the testator deems salutary. Once
again, in that event, we have little cause to predict a testator
would answer a beneficiary’s appeals for removal of a restriction, even if made in seemingly dire circumstances. After all,
paternalists always act against the wishes of the paternalized
party; they must not see to, but through all efforts to prevail
upon them, while shutting their ears to cries of protest. In this
regard, a paternalistic testator might even welcome the rigidity
of dead-hand control as a bulwark against his or her own softheartedness or vulnerability to persuasion.274
The case differs with respect to restrictions on a beneficiary’s consumption choices, or simply future allocations among
beneficiaries. Here, apparently acting out of straightforward
concern for beneficiaries’ welfare, a testator would have reason
to accede to revisions if and when needs change down the road.
Lawmakers therefore have greater cause to apply the antidead-hand principle in these instances.
In sum, a doctrine of trust modification premised on imputed intent should take into consideration inferences lawmakers can draw as to the testator’s resoluteness and should also
take the form of a default rule.275 Otherwise, such a doctrine
cent case, the court reflected upon the testator’s reasons for imposing a religious marital restriction:
The record . . . reveals that [the testator’s] intent in restricting the
distribution of his estate was to benefit those descendants who opted
to honor and further his commitment to Judaism by marrying within
the faith. [The testator] had expressed his concern about the potential
extinction of the Jewish people . . . by gradual dilution as a result of
intermarriage with non-Jews. While he was willing to share his bounty with a grandchild whose spouse converted to Judaism, this was
apparently as far as he was willing to go.
In re Estate of Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d 888, 896 (Ill. 2009).
274. The same concern may motivate some testators while alive to withhold the details of their estate plans from beneficiaries. See Robert Solomon,
Helping Clients Deal with Some of the Emotional and Psychological Issues of
Estate Planning, PROB. & PROP., Mar.–Apr. 2004, at 56, 57–58 (discussing preferences for secrecy).
275. In several recent cases, courts have denied petitions to modify the
provisions of trusts on the basis of inferences concerning the settlor’s probable
anticipation of the changed circumstance and inferences concerning the testator’s resolve. See Smith v. Hallum, 691 S.E.2d 848, 850 (Ga. 2010) (involving
the changed circumstance of an attack by one deranged beneficiary on another
beneficiary); In re Trust D Created Under the Last Will of Darby, 234 P.3d
793, 801 (Kan. 2010) (addressing inflation as a changed circumstance); La-
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will clash for no apparent reason with its analogue in contract
law. That lawmakers have allowed the paths of these laws
nonetheless to diverge has a ready, and by now predictable, explanation: neither the Uniform Trust Code nor the third Restatement of Trusts ever once cites to contract doctrines of modification by way of comparison.276
Lawmakers still might premise a doctrine of modification
on the costs future interests impose on beneficiaries, balanced
against the benefits they bring testators.277 In reworking the
doctrine along these lines, lawmakers would again need to bear
in mind the importance that a condition or use restriction often
holds for those testators who trouble themselves to impose one,
together with the ex ante consequences of a rule operating potentially to confound testamentary intent. Faced with a mandatory doctrine of modification, a single-minded testator might
prefer to disinherit beneficiaries in favor of charity or simply to
spend more wealth during his or her lifetime.278 A weighing of
interests calls for freedom to impose a condition or a use restriction for some space of time postmortem; a mandatory power of modification should come into effect only after that time
has elapsed.279
dysmith Rescue Squad, Inc., v. Newlin, 694 S.E.2d 604, 608 (Va. 2010) (addressing disputation among beneficiaries as a changed circumstance).
276. See UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 105(b)(4), 412–413 & cmts. (amended 2005),
7C U.L.A. 428, 507–10 (2006); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 65–67 &
cmts. (2003).
277. See supra notes 228–30, 271 and accompanying text; see also Hirsch &
Wang, supra note 5, at 21, 50–51. One of the Restatement rules, which does
not depend on changed circumstances, authorizes judicial modification if the
court “determines that the reason(s) for . . . modification outweigh the material purpose.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65(2) (2003); see also supra
note 239 and accompanying text.
278. Under current law, future interests out of trust escape the reach of the
rules of modification found in the Uniform Trust Code and the third Restatement of Trusts, so a settlor bent on imposing inflexible conditions or use restrictions could avoid the threat of modification by steering clear of trust law.
Lawmakers, in turn, could foreclose this evasion by extending trust rules of
modifications to future interests out of trust, but that might simply occasion
further distortions of a settlor’s estate plan.
279. The Uniform Trust Code takes this approach with respect to its cy
pres doctrine, which becomes mandatory after twenty-one years, but not with
regard to the Code’s general doctrine of trust modification, which becomes
mandatory immediately. Compare UNIF. TRUST CODE § 413(b)(2) (amended
2005), 7C U.L.A. 509 (2006), with id. §§ 105(b)(4), 412(a). See supra text accompanying notes 236–38; see also Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 222, at
1340 (offering a proposal for a mandatory general doctrine of trust modification taking effect only “after the income beneficiaries alive at the creation of
the trust are dead”).
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CONCLUSION
This Article has advocated assimilating contracts and wills
into a single genus of legal doctrine. Glimpsed from this vantage, existing rules of contracts and wills betray troubling inconsistencies between parallel doctrines and, what is worse,
contradictions at points of intersection where the rules sometimes operate at cross-purposes. Lawmakers need to confront
these anomalies. To be sure, categorical fragmentation is not
directly to blame for them and has not caused anomalies invariably to appear. On occasion, lawmakers operating within separate categories manage to arrive at comparable conclusions
without coordinating their efforts.280 Nevertheless, fragmentation has tended to distract attention from the structural relationships and potential interplay of contracts and wills, thereby
creating an environment in which anomalies could flourish.
Categorical union would improve matters, again indirectly, by
illuminating analogies and connections that the prevailing
framework of categories obfuscates.
The weight of scholarly opinion nowadays favors whittling
down freedom of testation.281 Comparative analysis with freedom of contract suggests, on the contrary, extending liberty of
will-making beyond even its existing, not inconsiderable, latitude. To adopt the more fashionable course would further aggravate the disharmony between freedom of testation and freedom of contract. Lawmakers could, of course, get to grips with
the problem the other way around, by narrowing freedom of
contract. Analysis mindful of the accepted grounds for invading
liberty of transfer nevertheless counsels against pursuing that
avenue to doctrinal consistency.
It may be worth noting that any enlargement of freedom of
testation would not occur against a background of anomie and
should disturb established patterns of testation only slightly, if
at all. Although individuals can follow idiosyncratic paths of
will-making more easily than in other actions—for they do not
have to suffer the social repercussions of this action282—most
280. See supra notes 53–54, 131–32 and accompanying text.
281. For a recent discussion, see MADOFF, supra note 32, at 154 –56. The
Uniform Trust Code and the third Restatement of Trusts both make moves in
this direction. See supra notes 65, 235–39 and accompanying text.
282. For a statement of the relative freedom of testators from social constraints, see M. Meston, The Power of the Will, 27 JURID. REV. 172, 173 (1982).
For further discussions, see Adam J. Hirsch, The Problem of the Insolvent
Heir, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 587, 639 (1989); Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 13.
For an early observation, see HOBHOUSE, supra note 228, at 94. Although so-
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wish to be remembered in a positive light.283 In the main, individuals follow prevalent norms when designing their estate
plans.284 When deviations occur, they may even set new trends.
The occasional “norm entrepreneur” has succeeded in transforming testamentary convention over the course of American
history.285
If anything, this social reality suggests additional reasons
for strengthening freedom of testation. On the one hand, we
can predict that doing so will yield few more aberrant estate
plans. And on the other hand, by so doing we set the stage for a
kind of recurring moral triumph. If Auden was wrong,286 if
freedom fulfilled constitutes a value in itself, then freedom selfrestrained offers even greater value, by presenting an abiding
testament—in both senses of the word—to the better angels of
our nature.

cial disapproval could be accounted a “cost” of unorthodox testation—and thus
potentially a spillover cost—it represents both an economically insignificant
and philosophically controversial one. See supra notes 145–47 and accompanying text.
283. For a discussion of this reputational component of testation, see
Hirsch, supra note 142, at 53–55.
284. For a study, see T.P. Schwartz, Testamentary Behavior: Issues and
Evidence About Individuality, Altruism and Social Influences, 34 SOC. Q. 337
passim (1993).
285. See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 30–32 (2000) (discussing
the role of norm entrepreneurs within social norm theory). A leading example
is Andrew Carnegie, whose testamentary preference for charity over children
has influenced succeeding generations of Americans, in particular those whose
wealth (like Carnegie’s) was “self-made.” Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 44
n.170. Thus Bill Gates, currently the wealthiest American, has pledged to give
away ninety-five percent of his wealth to charity, asserting that he does not
want to “burden[ ]” his children with his wealth, see Nadine Brozan, Chronicle,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1995, at B6, while the second-wealthiest American similarly characterizes a sizeable inheritance as “debilitating” to one’s children.
JANET LOWE, WARREN BUFFETT SPEAKS 47–48 (1997). These voices echo Carnegie: “I would as soon leave my son a curse as the almighty dollar.” Andrew
Carnegie, Wealth, 148 N. AM. REV. 653, 658 (1889), reprinted in DEMOCRACY
AND THE GOSPEL OF WEALTH 4 (Gail Kennedy ed., 1949). In many other countries, no comparable tradition of filial disinheritance exists. See Charity Ends
at Home, ECONOMIST, Apr. 6, 1996, at 39 (remarking the absence of such a
norm in China); Seth Faison, Who’s Afraid of Wei Jingsheng?, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 23, 1997, § 4, at 5 (same). But today’s American norm entrepreneurs are
working on the Chinese, with mixed success. See Renee Haines, We’re More
Likely to Give When We See How Easy It Is, CHINA DAILY (Beijing), Sept. 15,
2010, available at 2010 WLNR 18290585 (remarking efforts by Gates and Buffett to promote philanthropy in China); Michael Wines, In China, Attitudes on
Generosity Are Tested, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2010, at A4 (same).
286. See supra text accompanying note 17.
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Doubtless, some will question the conceptual realignment
proposed in this Article. The larger point, though, is the importance of the quest. Although one of law’s oldest vineyards, the
field of wills remains underdeveloped theoretically. Scholars
have rarely tilled its soil with the implements of interdisciplinary analysis that have proven so fruitful in other regions of
the legal landscape.287 But that is not all: as this Article has
ventured to show, intercategorical analysis can also cast a flood
of light upon a field that heretofore has remained too insular.
Toward this end, we must eschew specialization—a predisposition in most of law’s fields, indeed one that transcends legal
studies288—in pursuit of eclecticism and, to the fullest extent
possible, synthesis.
In a word, inheritance scholars must learn to think outside
the coffin. Only then can we revitalize a subject that presses so
relentlessly upon the world and figures so eventfully in our
lives.

287. Not so in the subfield of trusts, which—at least in part as a result—
has enjoyed a renaissance of late. For an observation, see Max M. Schanzenbach
& Robert H. Sitkoff, The Prudent Investor Rule and Trust Asset Allocation: An
Empirical Analysis, 35 AM. C. TR. & EST. COUNS. J. 314, 314 –15 (2010).
288. Specialization poses risks in science as well. See, e.g., P.B. MEDAWAR,
THE LIMITS OF SCIENCE 70–72 (1984).

